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Federal Reservation of Rights
to the Use of Water
Harold A. Ranquist*
Introduction
I. The Historical Setting, Origin, and Scope of the Winters Doctrine
A. The Historical Setting of the Winters Doctrine: Development of
the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
B. The Origin of the Winters Doctrine: Winters v. United States
C. The Scope of the Winters Doctrine: Water Impliedly Reserved to
Fulfill the Purposes of the United States in Establishing Reservations and Enclaves by Withdrawals from the Public Domain
11. The Application of the Winters Doctrine to Indian Reservations, Federal
Enclaves and Reservations, and the Public Domain
A. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Indian Reservations
1. The nature of the Indians' reserved water right
a. Uses for which water was reserved
b. The measure of water reserved for each use
2. Aboriginal water rights
3. The effect of the Reclamation Act of 1902 on reserved water
rights
4. The effect of other federal statutes on reserved water rights
5 . Rights of the non-Indian lessees, transferees, and entrymen
B. Application of the Winters Doctrine to National Parks, Monuments,
and Forests
1. The effect of the prior status of lands in national parks, monuments, and forests
a. Reserved and withdrawn lands
b. Acquired lands
2. The effect of various purposes for creating parks, monuments,
and other reservations: a discussion of United States u. Cappaert
C. Application of the Winters Doctrine t o Fish and Wildlife Areas
Reserved by the United States
1. Activities of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife
2. The measure of the reserved water right and full development
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3. Minimum stream flows
D. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Lands of the Public Domain
1. The effect of statutes on federal reserved rights to water on the
public domain
2. Creation of federal water rights by application to beneficial
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3. Summary
E. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Military Reservations
1. The issue of state jurisdiction over the military's reserved water
rights
2. Water rights of acquired lands on military reservations
3. The military purposes for which water was reserved
4. The effect of nonuse, abandonment, or transfer
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Rights
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b. The relationship of the McCarran Amendment to other
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c. State enabling acts and constitutions
d. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment
3. Removal of Indian water rights cases to federal court
4. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over interstate stream
apportionments
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1. Administrative authority and action to determine Indian
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"Have you ever heard anything about God, Topsy?"
The child looked bewildered, but grinned as usual. "Do you
know who made you?"
"Nobody, as I knows on," said the child, with a short laugh.
. . . [alnd she added,
"I spect I grow'd."'
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The concept of the implied reservation of water to fulfill the
purposes of the federal sovereign, like Topsy, just "grow'd." And
just as Topsy was a product of her background and circumstances, the legal concept of reserved water rights, known as the
Winters doctrine, is a natural product of the circumstances surrounding the development of water law in the Western States.
This article is divided into three sections. Section I provides
a brief overview of the historical setting, origin, and present scope
of the Winters doctrine. Section II discusses its application as a
judicially developed concept to specific types of federal lands,
including Indian reservations; national parks, monuments, and
forests; fish and wildlife reserves; the public domain; and military reservations. The incomplete development of the standards
to be used in applying the doctrine and its effect on the administration of water is commented upon in that section. Section I11
examines state and federal claims to legislative, judicial, and
administrative authority over reserved water rights and emphasizes the role of the Department of the Interior and other federal
agencies in the development and administration of these water
rights. Further, that section urges the establishment of an administrative mechanism for resolving the numerous unanswered
questions of law and fact which pervade this area of the law. The
section identifies the federal authority and capabilities presently
existing and available to establish a mechanism, which will identify the reserved right to the use of water on a use-by-use basis
in each watershed. A method for intergrating that administrative
mechanism with the states' administrative and judicial systems
is suggested.
SETTING,ORIGIN,AND SCOPE
I. THEHISTORICAL
OF THE Winters DOCTRINE

A. T h e Historical Setting of the Winters Doctrine:
Development of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
No discussion of the Winters doctrine is complete without
reference to the development of t h e doctrine of prior
appropriation in the states of the arid West. Although the appropriation doctrine developed through state law, while the Winters
doctrine is a federal development, each system finds its origin in
the federal sovereign. Further, both establish the right to use
water in the same streams. Therefore, the operation of each system can be fully understood and explained only by reference to
its effect upon the other.
The following discussion of the appropriation doctrine is not
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intended as a comprehensive statement of western water law.2
The discussion's twofold objective is simple: (1)to assist the practitioner in locating the relevant source material in this area, and
(2) to demonstrate that the Winters doctrine is not an aberration
in the field of water law, but rather a natural outgrowth of the
development of water law in the Western States.
When the federal government acquired western lands
through the Louisiana Purchase and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, little was known of the area. It was considered desert
land incapable of crop production except along the rivers of the
Great Plains and on the coastal strip bordering the Pacific Ocean.
The area was unpopulated except for Indian communities: agricultural pueblos along the Rio Grande, farming communities of
the Navajo and Pima-Maricopa Tribes, seed collecting cultures
of California, fishing-based cultures of the Northwest, and nomad
hunters of the Great Plains. By the mid-1800's, there was also a
small irrigated colony in the Salt Lake Valley and surrounding
areas established by the Mormon pioneers under Brigham Young.
With the discovery of gold in the West and the race to expand
the number of both free and slave states in the Midwest, the
settlement of the West increased rapidly. Miners swarmed over
the uninhabited land, occupying the public domain and operating their mines with the silent acquiescence of the United States
Government. To bring order out of the resulting chaos, the miners
and the pioneers established customs and rules which regulated
the ownership and operation of the mines and the right to the use
of water. In essence, these rules provided that the first to locate
the mining claim and the first to use the water held a prior right
and would be protected against the claims of othersn3
The United States owned all western lands not privately held
under previous sovereigns and possessed the power to dispose of
these lands and the water, together or ~ e p a r a t e l y .By
~ its
acquiescence, the United States permitted those persons whose
rights were recognized by the developing customs and rules to
possess the public lands and waters and to divert those waters out
of their watersheds and across the public lands to distant mining
2. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the development of western
water law see W. HUTCHINS,
WATERRIGHTSLAWSIN THE NINETEEN
WESTERNSTATES(U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 1971) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS].
3. See McGowan, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain,
11 WYO.L.J. 1, 12-14 (1956).
4. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162
(1935).
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claims and irrigated tractse5The existence of federal authority to
dispose of the water on one hand, and the actual disposition of
that water under the growing doctrine of prior appropriation on
the other, resulted in conflict between the first appropriator of
water and the federal patentee who claimed an unencumbered
title.
Shortly after the close of the Civil War, legislative proposals
were made to have Congress withdraw the mines from the public
domain of the West and either operate or sell them to obtain
revenue to retire the Civil War debt. The opposition of western
Senators and Congressmen resulted, however, in the enactment
of legislation in 18666which expressly confirmed both the rights
of the miners and the rights of the appropriators of water.' A
current water rights treatise explains the effect of the 1866 Act:
The Act of 1866 thus gave formal sanction of the Government to appropriations of water on public lands of the United
States, whether made before or after passage of the act, and
rights of way in connection therewith, provided that the appropriations conformed to principles established by customs of
local communities, State or Territorial laws, and decisions of
courts. The act contained no procedure by which such rights
could be acquired from the United States while the lands remained part of the public domain. W h a t it did was to take
cognizance of the customs and usages that had grown u p on t h e
public lands under State and Territorial sanction and to m a k e
compliance therewith essential t o the enjoyment of the Federal
grant.
. . . The act merely recognized the obligation of the Government to respect private rights which had grown up under its
tacit consent and approval. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459
(1879). It proposed no new system, but sanctioned, regulated,
and confirmed the system already established, to which the people were a t t a ~ h e d . ~

An 1870 amendment9 to the 1866 Act provided that all federal patents, homestead rights, or rights of preemption would be
subject to any vested and accrued water rights or rights-of-way
for ditches or reservoirs acquired or recognized under the Act of
1866. The amendment clarified the intent of Congress
-

5. Id. at 154; Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 682 (1875); see Forbes v. Gracey, 94
U S . 762, 763 (1877).
6. Act of July 26,1866, ch. 262,14 Stat. 251, as amended ch. 235,16 Stat. 217 (1870).
7. 1 S . WIEL,WATER
RIGHTS
IN WESTERN
STATES§ 93 (3d ed. 1911).
172-73 (emphasis added).
8. 1 HUTCHINS
9. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217, amending ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
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that the water rights and rights of way to which the 1866 legislation related were effective not only as against the United States,
but also as against its grantees-that anyone who acquired title
to public lands took such title burdened with any easements for
water rights or rights of way that had been previously acquired,
with the Government's consent, against such lands while they
were in public ownership. lo

Seven years later, in 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land
Actl1 which
provided that water rights on tracts cf desert land should depend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and that all surplus
water over and above actual appropriation and necessary use,
together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of
water upon the public lands and not navigable, should be held
free for appropriation by the public for irrigation, mining, and
manufacturing purposes, subject to existing rights. This act
applied specifically t o Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. An amendment in 1891 extended the provisions to Colorado.12

The highest courts of the various states could not agree on
whether the application of the 1877 Act was limited to arid and
desert lands or included all lands. The question was finally
settled by the United States Supreme Court in 1935 when the
Court held in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co. l3 that the Desert Land Act applied to all the public
domain of the states and territories named. More importantly,
the Court also held that the Act severed the water from the public
lands, leaving the unappropriated waters of nonnavigable sources
open to appropriation for use by the citizens of the various states
and territories pursuant to local law.
Thus, the conflict between prior appropriators and federal
patentees was resolved in favor of the former. Not only were appropriators protected against grantees of the federal government,
they could also appropriate water on the entire public domain of
the Western States, not just arid or desert lands.
A second conflict developed between the common law riparian concepts of water rights and the developing appropriation
doctrine. Each western state, either in its constitution or by legis10.
11.
12.
13.

1 HUTCHINS
173.
Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), as amended 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
1 HUTCHINS
173 (citations omitted).
295 U S . 142, 160-63 (1935).
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lation, sought to resolve the clash between these two systems of
water law.14 Generally, the states followed one of three approaches. Some, such as California and Washington, adopted a
dual system known as the California doctrine in which appropriative rights and riparian rights continued to coexist.15Others, such
as Oregon, recognized riparian rights which had actually been
exercised by making beneficial use of the water prior to adoption
of a comprehensive statutory water system with a priority as of
the date of entry; all rights arising thereafter had to be established in compliance with the statutory system that used the
appropriation concept. l6 The third approach, followed in Colorado, recognized only appropriative rights. Those states that
presently recognize only appropriative rights are said to be following the Colorado doctrine."
As the dispute raged between states and among citizens of
the various states over which doctrine, riparian or appropriation,
was best as a practical matter, or which was legally correct, the
United States Supreme Court observed in dictum in Kansas v.
color ad^,^^ a 1907 stream apportionment suit, that each state
could determine for itself which rules, whether riparian or appropriative, it would follow with respect to water rights. The Court
stated further that Congress had no authority to force either rule
upon a state. In 1935, in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co. ,I9 the Court's earlier dictum was elevated
to law when the Supreme Court held that a federal patent conveyed only the land and that the question of relative rights to
water among the various citizens of a state is a question for state
law. The Court explicitly relied upon the Act of 1866, as amended
in 1870, and in part on the Desert Land Act of 1877." It should
be noted that this case dealt only with the respective rights to
water among the various citizens of a state.
14. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE$ 5 42-101 to -112 (Supp. 1975); ORE.REV. STA.$ 4 537, 538
(Supp. 1974); UTAHCODEANN.4 73-3 (1968); WASH.REV.CODEANN. $ 90.03.010 (Supp.
1974).
15. This solution was exemplified in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 225, 344-409, 10 P. 674,
724-63 (1886).
16. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to Use of Water, 33
TEx. L. REV.24, 32-35 (1954).
17. The Colorado doctrine was enunciated in Coffin v. Lefthand Ditch Co., 6 Colo.
443, 447 (1882): "We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian
owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel upon and over his lands, even
though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is inapplicable to Colorado."
18. 206 U S . 46, 94 (1907).
19. 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935).
20. Statutes cited notes 6, 9, and 11 supra.
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Early state water law legislation was generally incomplete.
The water law systems created thereby, however, developed into
elaborate and detailed schemes that erected a ladder of priorities
establishing the measure and extent of each right, the place and
nature of its use, the manner in which rights could be acquired
and used, and the method of giving notice to the public of each
use.21Because the states created and enforced comprehensive systems of water law, a pattern of reliance on state law developed
and the role of federal law was ignored for many years. No one
considered what right the federal sovereign had to make use of the
unappropriated water to fulfill its own purposes. Further, no one
considered how such a right might be established and recorded.
But in 1908 the United States Supreme Court thrust upon the
scene the federal reserved water right with the claim to an early
priority and a right to expand the use of water in the future as
the need arose, but with no known means of establishing the
amount of use or allowable types of uses. The painful howls of
protest from the states and from their water users were a t least
understandable. This response resulted in part from the failure
to recognize the already established principle that the source of
the authority to administer the use of water was the federal sovereign. It also demonstrated a failure to fully appreciate the concept
of federal supremacy as applied to the fulfillment of the federal
sovereign's objective^.^^
21. The same basic legal concepts are found in each state system: (1) beneficial use
is the measure of the existence and scope of the right; (2) the right may, but need not
necessarily, be appurtenant to the land; (3) ownership of the land itself is not considered
a basis for a water right; (4) the appropriated water may be applied a t any place where it
is needed, regardless of the distance from the stream; (5) diversions out of a watershed
and interstate diversions are protected; (6) the rights of the prior appropriator must be
filled before a junior appropriator is permitted to take water, and the burden of shortage
falls on those who have the latest right; (7) in time of shortage, there is no proration; (8)
the holder of the prior right can take no more water than is necessary for his original need;
(9) the rights of the various users among themselves are very carefully regulated by means
of court decrees, state administration practices, and a bevy of water masters and ditch
riders who operate a system of diversions through canals, headgates, and ditches; (10) the
right to the water is intended to be good as against the whole world except against someone
with an earlier priorit ; (11) each right is recorded in detail on a use-by-use basis; and
(12) mining, irrigation, municipal and sanitary purposes, and industrial power production
are recognized as ben cia1 uses. [I8811 Colo. Laws 142; [I8791 Colo. Laws 94; [I8811
Idaho Laws 267, 273; c . 115, [I8861 Kans. Laws Spec. Sess. 154; [I8851 Mont. Laws
130; ch. 68, [I8891 Nebr. Laws 503; ch. 20, [I8801 Utah Laws 36; ch. 61, [I8861 Wyo.
Laws 294.
Some of the states are beginning to recognize that recreation and the maintenance of
minimum stream flows are beneficial uses. See, e.g., WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 90.22.010
(Supp. 1974). In addition, the constitutions of some states have given a preference to some
CONST.art XV, § 3 (domestic use preferred over
water uses over others. See, e.g., IDAHO
all other uses, and agricultural use preferred over manufacturing).
22. See text accompanying notes 204 & 205 infra.
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B. The Origin of the Winters Doctrine:
Winters v. United States
In the 1908 case of Winters v. United States,23the United
States Supreme Court held that the right to use the nonnavigable
waters of the Milk River, which flowed through or bordered on the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in Montana, was impliedly reserved by the government and the Indians in the treaty establishing the reservation. In its decision, the Court recognized that
conflicting implications concerning the intent of the sovereign
arose from the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation
of the reservation, but held that the implication "which makes
for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which
makes for the cession."24The Court further declared that
[tlhe power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. That the Government did reserve them
we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily
continued through years.25
23. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
24. Id. at 576. The Court stated:
The [Indian] reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the
Indians had the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits
and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to become a
pastoral and civilized people. If they should become such the original tract was
too extensive, but a smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of
conditions. The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. And yet, it is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately given
up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government. The lands
ceded were, it is true, also arid; and some argument may be urged, and is urged,
that with their cession there was the cession of waters, without which they would
be valueless, and "civilized communities could not be established thereon." And
this, it is further contended, the Indians knew, and yet made no reservation of
the waters. We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which
makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which makes
for their cession. The Indians had command of the lands and the waterscommand of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing
roving herds of stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization.
Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give
up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? And, even regarding the
allegation of the answer as true, that there are springs and streams on the
reservation flowing about 2,900 inches of water, the inquiries are pertinent. If it
were possible to believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that the
Indians were awed by the power of the Government or deceived by its negotiators. Neither view is possible. The Government is asserting the rights of the
Indians.

Id.
25. Id. a t 577 (citations omitted).
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After fifty-five years of inconclusive debate over the legal
principle articulated in the Winters case, the Supreme Court, in
the 1963 case Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~ i s c u s the
s e d doctrine in
these terms:
The Court in "Winters" concluded that the Government,
when it created that Indian reservation, intended to deal fairly
with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which
their lands would have been useless. "Winters" has been followed by this Court as recently as 1939 in United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527. We follow i t now and agree that the
United States did reserve the water rights for the Indians effective as of the time the Indian reservations were created.27

As recently as 1971, in United States v. District Court for
Eagle County,2Rthe Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles articulated in Winters. Further, both the National Water Commission and the Public Land Law Review Commission in their reports on the subject have recognized the existence of the principle
that the federal sovereign impliedly reserved water to fulfill its
purposes when it withdrew lands from the public domain.2g
The Winters case and its progeny have been used by the
courts to define the already existing power of the federal sovereign
over water, particularly the power of the sovereign to reserve unappropriated water to fulfill its purposes.30Indeed, with the
Winters doctrine, the courts have filled the void in the law created when Congress gave the states authority to administer individual rights to the use of water within their boundaries3' without
establishing a means whereby the federal sovereign could secure
the water needed for its purposes. It should be remembered in this
context that there is no body of statutory law governing the reservation of water by the federal sovereign-the doctrine rests solely
in judicial decisions.
26. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
27. Id. at 600.
28. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
29. NATIONAL
WATERCOMM'N,WATERPOLICIESFOR THE FUTURE459-83 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL
WATERCOMM'N];1 C. WHEATLEY,
C. CORKER,
T. STETSON
& D. REED,STUDYOF THE DEVELOPMENT,
MANAGEMENT,
AND USE OF WATER
RESOURCES
ON
THE PUBLIC
LANDS61-145 (1969) (prepared for the Public Land Law Review Comm'n)
[hereinafter cited as WHEATLEY]
.
30. For a discussion of the constitutional source of that power see the text accompanying notes 195-198 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 6-13 supra.
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C. T h e Scope of the Winters Doctrine: Water Impliedly
Reserved to Fulfill the Purposes of the United States i n
Establishing Reservations and Enclaves by Withdrawals
from the Public Domain
In Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i athe
~ ~ Supreme Court not only reaffirmed the viability of the Winters doctrine, but for the first time
extended its application beyond Indian reservations. The Court,
by adopting the holding of the special master initially appointed
to hear the case,33upheld claims asserted by the United States
to the waters of the Colorado River and some of its tributaries for
use on non-Indian federal reservations such as national forests
and recreation and wildlife areas.34
Since the Court discussed only the claims on behalf of Indian
reservations, it is necessary to refer to the report of the special
master to determine the basis for extending the doctrine of reserved water rights to other reservations and enclaves. The special master first determined that the United States had the power
to reserve water to fulfill its purposes in creating the various kinds
of reservations involved in the case. With respect to the Lake
Mead National Recreation Area, for example, he declared:
It is necessary to adjudicate the water rights of the Lake
Mead National Recreation Area for the same reason that the
rights of the mainstream Indian Reservations must be adjudicated. I conclude that the United States had the power to reserve water in the Colorado River for use in the Lake Mead
National Recreation Area for the same reasons that it could
reserve such water for Indian Reservations. Although the authorities discussed above which establish the reservation theory
all involved Indian Reservations, the principles seem equally
applicable to lands used by the United States for its other
purposes. If the United States can set aside public land for an
Indian Reservation and, at the same time, reserve water for the
future requirements of that land, I can see no reason why the
United States cannot equally reserve water for public land
which it sets aside as a National Recreation Area. Certainly
none of the parties has suggested a tenable distinction between
the two ~ i t u a t i o n s . ~ ~
32. 373 U S . 546 (1963).
33. Special masters are appointed by the Supreme Court in interstate stream apportionment suits. For a discussion of the original jurisdiction of the Court in such cases see
section 111, B, 4 infra.
34. 373 U.S. a t 601.
35. Report of Special Master Rifkind a t 292-93 (1960), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963) (citation omitted), [hereinafter cited as Special Master]. With respect to the
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After determining that the United States had the power to
reserve water for use upon the non-Indian federal reservations
involved," the special master determined that the circumstances
surrounding their creation demonstrated the intent of the United
States to do so.37
In 1971 the Supreme Court identified those lands for which
a reserved water right may be implied. That year, in its most
recent decision involving reserved rights, United States u. District Court for Eagle C o ~ n t ythe
, ~ ~Court declared:
It is clear from our cases that the United States often has
reserved water rights based on withdrawals from the public
domain. As we said in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the
Federal Government had the authority both before and after a
State is admitted into the Union "to reserve waters for the use
and benefit of federally reserved lands." Id., at 597. The federally reserved lands include any federal enclave. In Arizona v.
California we were primarily concerned with Indian reservations. Id., at 598-601. The reservation of waters may be only
implied and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal
enclave .39
power to reserve water to serve the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial
National Wildlife Refuge, and the Cibola Valley Waterfowl Management Area see id. a t
296-98.
36. These included wildlife refuges, waterfowl management areas, and recreation
areas.
37. Again in the context of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, Special Master
Rifkind declared:
In determining whether the United States intended to reserve water for future
reasonable needs of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, I have followed
the course outlined in regard to Indian Reservations. Since the purposes of the
Recreation Area could not be fully carried out without the use of water from the
mainstream of the Colorado River, I have found that the United States intended
to reserve such water for use within the Recreation Area. Furthermore, having
found that the United States intended to reserve water for the Area, I have
assumed, since there is no evidence to the contrary, that the reservation was
for reasonable future requirements. As in the case of Indian Reservations, it is
not likely that the United States intended that any future development of the
Area would have to depend on appropriative rights to water obtained under
state law.
Special Master, supra note 35, a t 293. The federal government's intent to reserve water
for the other lands involved was also discussed. Id. a t 296-98.
Some commentators, following the decision in Arizona v. California, sought to narrow
the scope of the holding by noting that, except for Indian reservations, the federal uses
involved therein were minimal. Therefore, they claimed that the water rights which the
United States could reserve for non-Indian reservations and enclaves were limited to those
which were, by their nature, de minimus. See Address by Mr. Charles P. Corker, Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Institute, July 18, 1971.
38. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
39. Id. a t 522-23.
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Thus, water rights may have been impliedly reserved to serve
not only Indian reservations but also any federal enclave created
by reserving or withdrawing lands from the public domain.
Whether the United States can reserve water to serve acquired
lands, as opposed to reserved or withdrawn lands, is undecided.40
In light of Eagle County, however, it is apparent that a court can
find a federal reserved water right if (1) the land in question
constitutes a federal enclave or reservation, (2) the land is withdrawn from the public domain, and (3) the circumstances surrounding creation of the enclave or withdrawal of the reservation
reveal an intent to reserve water.
The term federal enclave historically meant those military
areas described in article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United
States C o n ~ t i t u t i o n .Today,
~~
however, the definition includes
any land of the United States, or private land within an enclave,
where the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive legislative authority.42
Since the reservation doctrine arose in the Western States,
where most land was once public land held by the United States,
it is also necessary to differentiate between public lands and
reserved lands of the United States. Congress has defined public
lands as those lands owned by the United States that are subject
to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws,43
whereas reservations are not, after withdrawal, subject to such
disposal.44Therefore, a reserved water right may be implied to
serve any formerly public lands withdrawn or reserved by the
federal sovereign if, at the time of withdrawal, the sovereign intended to accomplish a purpose that requires the use of water for
its fulfillment.
40. For a discussion of this issue see section 11, B, 1, b infra.
41. The definition is included in a proviso which gives Congress the power to:
[Elxercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .
U.S. CONST.art. I, 4 8, c1. 17.
42. Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1968). In Collins v. Yosemite Park
& Curry Roman Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529 (1938), the Supreme Court established that enclaves over which the United States has jurisdiction are not limited to those established
for the military purposes enumerated in art. I, 4 8, cl. 17.
For a discussion of exclusive legislative authority, see text accompanying notes 225227 infra.
43. See generally FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1955).
44. Id. a t 444.
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11. THEAPPLICATION
OF THE Winters DOCTRINE
TO INDIAN
RESERVATIONS,
FEDERAL
ENCLAVES
AND OTHER
RESERVATIONS,
AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN
The first five subsections of this section discuss the application of the Winters doctrine to Indian reservations; national
parks, monuments, and forests; fish and wildlife areas; the public
domain; and military reservations. Certain questions concerning
the Winters doctrine, although applicable to more than one type
of land, will be addressed only once, a t the most appropriate
point. These questions include: How is the implied intent to reserve water established? For what purposes or uses was water
reserved? What is the measure of water reserved for each use?
Does the Indian reserved right include immemorial, or aboriginal,
water rights? How is the reserved right modified or affected by
federal or state statutes? Does the Winters doctrine apply to acquired lands as well as to withdrawn or reserved lands? What
happens to reserved water rights when reserved lands are leased
or transferred? Who has the interim right to use reserved waters
not presently being used by the holder of the reserved right? Yet
another question is discussed only briefly in a sixth subsection,
because the author has already addressed it in another publicat i ~ n : What
'~
is the effect of a change in the place or nature of the
use of reserved waters?
While considering the specific applications of the Winters
doctrine in the subsections which follow, it is important to keep
in mind that there is no statute dealing directly with the subject-the doctrine is judicially created. Because the courts defined only as much of the doctrine as was necessary to resolve
each particular controversy, many issues concerning the nature
and scope of these water rights have been left ~ndeterrnined.'~
Also, the states have for various reasons opposed the development
~ cumulative result has been confuof the Winters d ~ c t r i n e . 'The
sion, conflict, and controversy between federal and state interests
and pronounced disagreement among legal scholars.48Since water
45. For a full citation to the publication mentioned see note 194 infra.
46. 2 WHEATLEY,
supra note 29, at 556-63.
47. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western' Waters-A Decade of Attempted
"Clarifying Legislation, " 20 RUTGERS
L. REV.423 (1966).
48. The following is a representative sampling: Ely, Federal-State Relations in Water
Resources Development, statement in behalf of the American Bar Association before the
NATIONAL
WATERCOMM'N,
National Water Comm'n, November 6, 1969; F. TRELEASE,
RELATION
IN WATER
LAWS(1971) [hereinafter cited as
LEGALSTUDYNO. 5: FEDERAL-STATE
F. TRELEASE];
Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in Priority
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is scarce, and a secure, steady supply is essential to economic
growth in the West, the stakes are high and the emotions of the
participants are deeply involved.
The purpose of this section is not to propose solutions on a
piecemeal basis for the multitude of unsettled issues. Rather, i t
is to identify the present state of the law and the major unresolved issues concerning the Winters doctrine. Section I11 proposes the establishment of an administrative procedure to deal
with these issues in a comprehensive and cohesive fashion.

A. Application of the Winters Doctrine to
Indian Reservations
The doctrine of the implied reservation of nonnavigable
waters was applied in the Winters case49to an Indian reservation
created pursuant to a treaty antedating the admission of Montana to statehood. Since that decision, the courts have applied
the doctrine to navigable and nonnavigable waters50and to Indian
reservations created by treaty, statute, and executive order,51
both before and after statehood.52The courts have not, to date,
excluded any Indian reservations from the ambit of the doctrine,53
States, 28 HARV.L. REV. 270 (1915); Bloom, Indian Paramount Rights to Water Use, 16
ROCKY
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.669 (1971); Carver, The Implied Reservation Doctrine: Policy
or Law, 6 LAND& WATERL. REV. 117 (1970); Clark, The Federal Interest in Water
85 (1963); Corker, Federal-State RelaResources, LISTWESTERN
WATERLAWSYMPOSIUM
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.
tions in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 ROCKY
579 (1971); Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HARV.L. REV. 332
(1961); Goldberg, Interposition- Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN.L. REV. 1 (1964);
Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over
Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV.33 (1968); Martz, The Role of Government in Public
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.1 (1970); Morreale, Federal Power
Resource Management, 15 ROCKY
in Western Waters with Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL
RESOURCES
J . 1 (1963); Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade
L. REV.423 (1966); Trelease, Arizona
of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation, 20 RUTGERS
v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUP.CT.
REV.158; Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF.L. REV.
638 (1957); Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY
MT. MINERAL
L. REV.37 (1960);
Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government-States' Rights us. National
Powers, 19 WYO.L.J. 189 (1965); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use
L. INST.631 (1971); Warner, Federal Reserved Water
of Water, 16 ROCKYMT. MINERAL
Rights and Their Relationship to Appropriative Rights in the Western States, 15 ROCKY
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.399 (1969). For a recent discussion of the present status of the
controversy see Symposium-Federal Reserved Rights, 8 NATURAL
RESOURCES
LAW219
"

(1975).
49. 207 U S . 564 (1908).
50. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irr.
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir.
1908).
51. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irr.
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
52. Arizona v. California, 373 U S . 546, 597 (1963).
53. Whether the pueblos on the Rio Grande River, because of the particular circum-
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thus in effect adopting the position taken for many years by the
Department of the Interior that the Winters doctrine applies to
all reservations to the same extent, regardless of how or when
created.54Further, the courts in applying the Winters doctrine
have held that the sources of reserved waters include waters arising upon, flowing through, or bordering Indian reservations." The
water was reserved as of the date the reservations were created?
Whether waters may be reserved in a distant stream when there
is insufficient water available on a reservation has never been
decided. Several courts have applied the doctrine of reserved
water rights to gr~undwater.~'
Some courts and commentators, in discussing the reservation
of water for Indian reservations created by treaty, have posited
that it was the Indians and not the United States who reserved
the water.18 Such a position, however, should be approached with
caution as it is not supported by the weight of the case law and
may operate to the detriment of the Indians?
stances surrounding those reservations and their historical water rights, also have federally reserved water rights is discussed in the text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
54. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600 (1963); United States v. Walker
River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). See also Letter from the Secretary of the
Interior to the Attorney General, November 8, 1935 (concerning the appeal of the Walker
River Indian Reservation case cited above).
55. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,600 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
56. Cases cited note 55 supra.
57. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041
(1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968);
United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965).
58. The advocates of this position, citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381
(1905), claim that an Indian treaty establishing a reservation "is not a grant of rights t o
the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted." See,
e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 987 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights
to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.631, 645-49 (1971).
59. Some reservations were not created by treaty, but by executive order or statute.
For example, the Walker River and Pyramid Lake Indian Reservations were created by
EXECUTIVE
ORDERS
RELATING
TO INDIAN
executive orders. See U.S. DEP'TOF THE INTERIOR,
RESERVATIONS
FROM MAY14, 1855 TO JULY
1, 1912 (1912). A claim could be made that if
the water was impliedly reserved by treaty, the nontreaty reservations would be without
a reserved water right. The courts, however, have extended the doctrine to imply the
reservation of waters on Indian reservations whether created by treaty, statute, or executive order. Cases cited note 51 supra.
Further, to suggest that the Indians contemplated reserving the water credits them
with a n intent which they were incapable of enforcing, then or now, without the active
assistance of the United States. The protection of their rights, even their very existence,
BURY
has in the past required affirmative action by the federal sovereign. See D. BROWN,
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The nature of the Indians' reserved water right

The water right reserved for the benefit of Indian reservations is not a public right; rather it is a private right held in trust
by the United States for the benefit of the Indians. Other reserved
water rights, in contrast, are public in natureebO
Further, the Indians' reserved water right, when used for irrigation, appears to be
in the nature of a right to realty. It may be appurtenant to the
landY In this way it is very much akin to state-created water
rights .62
The Indians' reserved water rights cannot be lost by nonuse
under state laws, nor by legal action of the various states through
condemnation, inverse condemnation, or statutory e n a ~ t m e n t , ~ ~
nor by private appr~priation.~~
The overriding power of the federal sovereign under the supremacy clauseb5of the Constitution
is the source of the protection of Indian property and water rights
The right protected
against state and private encroa~hment.~~
MY HEART
AT WOUNDED
KNEE(1970) (cataloging instances during the late 1800's of severe
deprivation at the hands of non-Indians which were resisted only by late and often ineffective federal action).
Finally, since the Indians are citizens of their respective states, water rights reserved
by them might arguably be lost by nonuse under state law or by state legal action. If the
federal sovereign is the source of the right, the Indians cannot be deprived of the water
by the application of state law. See authorities cited notes 63, 64 infra. Recognizing this,
the courts have based Indian reserved water rights upon the implied intent of the federal
sovereign,.not that of the Indians. See, e.g., Special Master, supra note 35, at 254-61, 292300.
60. As stated in NATIONAL
WATERCOMM'N,
supra note 29, a t 477:
Indian water rights are different from Federal reserved rights for such lands as
national parks and national forests, in that the United States is not the owner
of the Indian rights but is a trustee for the benefit of the Indians. While the
United States may sell, lease, quit claim, release, or otherwise convey its own
Federal reserved water rights, its powers and duties regarding Indian water
rights are constrained by its fiduciary duty to the Indian tribes who are beneficiaries of the trust.
61. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
62. Special Master, supra note 35, a t 263, 266. The effect of this characteristic on the
rights of non-Indian lessees and transferees is discussed in note 133 and accompanying
text infra.
63. See generally Rice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United
States, 16 J. COMP.LEG.& INT'LL. (3d ser.) 78 (1934); Letter from John V. Truesdale,
Special Assistant to Attorney General, to Nevada State Engineer, April 1, 1921 (concerning Moapa Indian Reservation).
64. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104
F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
art. VI, c1. 2.
65. U.S. CONST.
OF FEDERAL
INDIAN
LAW116-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
66. F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK
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cannot be set aside, overridden, or denied except as clearly specified by Congre~s.~?
Thus, the courts have held that since the
Indian is legally incapable of protecting his own rights, the federal government is obligated, as the trustee of Indian reserved
water rights, to protect and enforce those rights?
The Winters doctrine provides that sufficient water was reserved for the present and future needs of the Indians? This
reservation for future uses constitutes a significant departure
from western appropriative water law. That departure has caused
considerable consternation among and opposition from the states
and non-Indian water users. Because there is no well-defined
measure of the amount of water reserved for Indian uses, the
states and non-Indian water users have no assurance of the
quantity of water left for their use.70
The quantity of water reserved for Indians can be determined
only after examining (1)the uses or purposes for which water was
reserved, and (2) the appropriate measure of water to be allocated
for each use."
a. Uses for which water was reserved. Agricultural needs
have figured prominently in the application of the Winters docCOHEN];Solicitor's Memorandum concerning petition for certiorari in United States v.
Powers, 94 F.2d 783 (1938), to the Department of Justice, May 5, 1938.
67. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580-89 (1963). See also United States v.
Alexander, 131 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.
1939) (no title to waters impliedly reserved for Indian reservations can be acquired except
as specified by Congress). As stated in COHEN,supra note 66, a t 117:
It is enough for the present to note that the domain of power of the Federal
Government over Indian affairs marked out by the federal decisions is so complete that, as a practical matter, the federal courts and federal administrative
officials now generally proceed from the assumption that Indian affairs are
matters of federal, rather than state, concern, unless the contrary is shown by
act of Congress or special circumstance.
68. For a discussion of this obligation see Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist.,
236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965);
Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). But see United States v.
Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) (placing a limitation on future uses
based on historical use over 70 years, an action that is no longer justified in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California).
70. Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts
over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV.33, 42, 61 (1968). See also Morreale, FederalState Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation,"
L. REV.423 (1966).
20 RUTGERS
71. The place and time of diversion, the nature of each use, the amount of water
consumed, and the amount of return flow are all factors that should be considered in
establishing the measure of the reserved right.

THE WINTERS DOCTRINE

6391

657

trine to Indian reservation^.^^ For example, in Arizona v.
California, the Indian water rights were measured in terms of the
"practicably irrigable acreage" on the five reservations involved.73
The Supreme Court, however, based its decision on the special
master's report74which stated in pertinent part:
The reservations of water were made for the purpose of
enabling the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy;
other uses, such as those for industry, which might consume
substantially more water than agricultural uses, were not contemplated at the time the Reservations were created . . . . I
hold only that the amount of water reserved, and hence the
magnitude of the water rights created, is determined by agricultural and related requirements, since when the water was reserved that was the purpose of the reservation . . . .
. . . The measurement used in defining the magnitude of
the water rights is the amount of water necessary for agricultural
and related purposes because this was the initial purpose of the
reservations . . . .75

The basis of the special master's holding was that the sovereign reserved water to fulfill those purposes, whether agricultural
or other, for which the reservations were created. It should be
remembered, however, that the Supreme Court limited its decision in Arizona v. California to the facts in that case.76Thus it is
clear that when an Indian reservation is established to provide an
agricultural economy for the Indians, the measure of the water
right will include that amount of water necessary to irrigate the
practicably irrigable acreage and to satisfy related uses.77Nothing
has been said to date, however, by the Supreme Court or Congress
about an Indian reservation which has a purpose behind its creation different from that of establishing an agricultural economy
either in whole or in part.
Due to the unresolved status of this issue, the extent of the
reserved water rights of numerous Indian reservations remains
uncertain. One example is the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Reservation in Nevada, which completely encloses a large desert
lake a t the terminus of the Truckee River. The lake produces
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

p
p

72. See authorities cited note 64 supra; United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939);
United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v. United States, 273 F.
93 (9th Cir. 1921).
73. 373 U.S. at 596.
74. Id. a t 595.
75. Special Master, supra note 35, at 265-66 (emphasis added).
76. 373 U.S. at 595.
77. Id. at 600-01.
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large, highly marketable trout and other fish, upon which the
tribe has relied from time immemorial for its main source of food.
The fish were also used as an item for trade and barter with other
Indian bands before the arrival of the white man. That trade
continued with the white man prior to and after the establishment of the reservation. Indeed, it appears that one purpose for
establishing the reservation was to preserve to the Indians the
benefit of the lake and its fish.78A question now arises, however,
whether sufficient water was reserved in the Truckee River to
maintain the lake and the fishery. The correspondence and the
executive order creating the reservation are silent on the subject."
This particular issue is currently being litigated.80
When the purposes of a reservation differ from the agricul, ~ ~ possible
tural purpose described in Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i a two
standards suggest themselves for determining which uses will be
accorded reserved waters:
(1) Those uses necessary to fulfill the purposes contemplated at the time the reservation was created. This is the standard used by the special master in Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~
(2) All possible uses, including uses which appear in the
future without reference to the purposes contemplated at the
. ~ ~ standard is inferred
time of the creation of the r e s e r v a t i ~ nThis
by some constructions of United States v. Winansg4and United
States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District .85
The first, or contemplated purposes standard, would permit
78. United States v. Sturgeon, 27 F. Cas. 1357 (No. 16,413) (D. Nev. 1879)
(prosecution of a non-Indian for fishing in the lake without authority from the tribe).
79. Letter from Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, to General Land
Office, November 29,1859, and Exec. Order, March 23,1874 (signed by Ulysses S. Grant),
cited in United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 338 (9th Cir. 1939).
80. United States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed
Dec. 21, 1973). The claim is made for sufficient water to maintain the level of the lake
over the long run and sufficient water to sustain natural spawning runs for the fish.
However, that claim was not introduced by the United States in a prior adjudication of
the Truckee River and the defendants are seeking to bar the action under the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Whether those doctrines will prevent the claim
from being litigated is at issue in the first part of a bifurcated trial in the above case.
81. 373 U.S. a t 600-01.
82. Special Master, supra note 35, at 265-66.
83. The advocates of this second standard also advocate the view that the Indians,
not the federal government, reserved waters for the Indians' use. Thus, they perceive an
inquiry into the federal government's purposes for creating a reservation as irrelevant to
a determination of the existence or measure of reserved water rights. See note 59 supra.
84. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
85. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), reu'd. 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924
(1965).
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immediate quantification of the Indians' water rights. Its primary
advantage, therefore, is that a specific quantity of water can be
identified and protected from encroachment by others. Under the
second standard, on the other hand, the Indians' rights would
remain uncertain, and to a degree, unprotected. The non-Indian
is rapidly appropriating all available water and will claim a right
to continue that established use. The courts or Congress may
uphold such a claim, forcing the Indians to take monetary compensation for their water. That result could severely hinder the
preservation of viable Indian communities and the development
of Indian lands, minerals, and other resources. If it is to be protected, the Indians' right to use water must be quantified. Applying the contemplated use standard and branding the right so it
can be identified as to source and amount will make it possible
to protect the right and prevent the loss of this valuable resource.
If the contemplated purposes standard is adopted, the purposes underlying the creation of each Indian reservation must be
carefully considered. The various treaties and statutes creating
reservations speak in terms of providing a permanent home for
the Indian or of setting aside a place for him to live free from
encroachment by non-Indians." It appears that this language reveals an intention to permit the Indian to do the same thing with
the reserved lands of his home as the white man does with his
lands, such as irrigate the irrigable acres, develop the minerals,
create communities, preserve the environment for fish and game,
preserve minimum stream flows, provide for recreation, and establish industries to the extent that the lands lend themselves to
these types of development. Assuming that all of these purposes
were intended, not all may require water for their fulfillment. If
water is required, however, for the fulfillment of a contemplated
purpose, the sovereign may be deemed to have reserved the water.
b. The measure of water reserved for each use. Once it is
determined that water was reserved for the uses necessary to
fulfill a particular purpose, the quantity of water reserved for
each use must be determined. The measure for agricultural uses
will be that amount of water sufficient to irrigate the "practicably
irrigable acreage" and satisfy related uses.87What constitutes the
86. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wismer, 230 F. 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 246
U.S. 283 (1918) (discussing an 1877 agreement with the Spokane Indians); Treaty with
the Eastern Band of Shoshonees and the Bannock Tribe of Indians, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat.
673 (Treaty of Fort Bridger).
87. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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practicably irrigable acreage of an Indian reservation, however,
remains unclear.
The standard for determining the practicably irrigable
acreage and the economic feasibility of proposed water projects
on Indian reservations may differ substantially from the standard
applied to irrigation projects on non-Indian lands; the policies
and objectives underlying the two situations are substantially
, ~ ~ special master used a
different. In Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i athe
Bureau of the Budget reports0as a guide in determining the soil
characteristics and economic considerations involved in establishing the practicably irrigable acreage of the five reservations.
This guide, however, was promulgated for application to reclamation projects; it was not developed to accommodate the special
circumstances of Indian reservations. That report has since been
rescinded," as has its successor. Recently, Congress provided that
another report, the findings and recommendations of the Special
Task Force of the United States Water Resources C o ~ n c i l , ~ ~
should be used in proceedings for evaluation of water and related
land resource projects. The standards in those subsequent reports
were also promulgated without consideration of the peculiar nature of Indian reservations.
The need of the Indians to utilize the limited land base of
their reservations should compel a less stringent standard of feasibility than is applied to non-Indian lands. It should be remembered that to the Indian his lands represent much of his heritage.
Further, if he desires to maintain tribal ties, he generally cannot
go elsewhere in search of better lands. The necessity for less stringent standards of economic feasibility of irrigation projects bene88. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
89. The Special Master referred to exhibits 570, 1009, 1121, 1210 and 1322 of the
United States as the source for the correct number of irrigable acres on the Indian reservations involved in the case. Special Master, supra note 35, at 267-81. Those exhibits of the
OF THE BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
OF THE
United States relied on the standards in BUREAU
PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR
NO. A-47 (Dec. 31, 1952) (officially withdrawn May 15, 1962) in
calculating the practicably irrigable acreage of the reservations.
90. SEN.DOC.NO.97,87th Cong., 2d Sess. iii (1962) (statement of Senator Andersen).
91. The report, Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land
Resources, was adopted and published a t 38 Fed. Reg. 24777, 24789 (1973). It will not be
discussed herein because the Department of the Interior has not yet determined whether
it applies to projects constructed on Indian reservations. There are those who believe that
the trust responsibility of the United States requires it to assist Indian tribes, communities, and individuals to develop their lands without restrictive economic and social
considerations established for non-Indians. The counter argument suggests that some
standard for Indian projects is necessary, even if it excludes some lands that could be
irrigated.
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fiting Indian land was recognized by the Leavitt Actg2which permits the Secretary of the Interior to postpone repayment of the
construction cost of such projects. That postponement may be
continued as long as the land remains in Indian hands. Since
construction costs, as a practical matter, are repaid out of the
increased value of the land when it is sold and its trust status is
terminated, an Indian irrigation project can be considered economically feasible if it generates a return in excess of the operation and maintenance charges. This standard of feasibility which
disregards construction costs is being urged by the United States
in cases adjudicating the irrigable acreage of various Indian reservation~.~~
Some provisions of the Leavitt Act, however, should not be
viewed as part of that Act's standard of economic feasibility. For
example, the Secretary of the Interior, in cases of hardship and
unless Congress objects, may cancel not only the construction
costs but also the operation and maintenance charges of Indian
irrigation projects.94Such action is intended, however, as relief
from hardship encountered after a project is constructed. The
possibility of such relief should not be considered in the prospective evaluation of practicably irrigable acreage or project feasibility.
There are as yet no standards for determining the amount of
water reserved for nonagricultural uses. However, the measure
should be that amount of water necessary to fulfill the particular
purpose for which the water is impliedly reserved. The claims of
the United States on behalf of the Indians in three pending cases
demonstrate this principle. First, where a water right is asserted
for the purpose of sustaining a viable fishery in a desert lake and
its supporting stream, the United States claims sufficient water
to maintain the present level of the lake over the long term, and
sufficient stream flows to sustain spawning runs and to preserve
the in-stream habitat for the fish and their fingerlingd5 Second,
92. 25 U.S.C. 8 386a (1970); Act of August 1, 1914, ch. 222, § 1, 38 Stat. 583, as
amended 25 U.S.C. § 385 (1970).
93. E.g., United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S.
946 (1975) (No. 74-949), rev'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973) (involving the
Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Reservations on the San Juan River); New
Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abeyeta, Civil No. 7896 (D.N.M., filed Feb. 4, 1969); New
Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M., filed Apr. 20,1966) (the latter
two cases involve the New Mexico Pueblo Indian Reservations on the Rio Grande).
94. See Statutes cited note 92 supra as to Indian lands. See also 25 U.S.C. 5 389
(1970) (non-Indian lands served by Indian irrigation projects).
95. United States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed
Dec. 21, 1973). This case involves Pyramid Lake, a large desert lake enclosed entirely
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where coal mines exist on an Indian reservation, the claim is for
sufficient water to bring the coal to a marketable state? Finally,
if preservation of the ecology of a stream is the purpose to be
effectuated, the claim is for a minimum flow of water sufficient
to maintain the environment of the stream and its wildlife value~.~'
2. Aboriginal water rights

In addition to the water reserved by the federal sovereign
upon the creation of an Indian reservation, some Indian tribes
may have established an aboriginal, or immemorial, water right
by diversion and use prior to the acquisition of sovereign authority by the United States. This aboriginal right, simply stated, is
a right to continue using water as it was used by the Indians in
their aboriginal state from time immemorial. Such a right was
recognized in the adjudication of the Gila River; the PimaMaricopa Indian Tribe was held to have an aboriginal right to
irrigation waters from that river.g8Also, the Pueblo Land Act
recognizes an aboriginal right in the middle pueblos of the Rio
Grande .99
Two issues related to the Pueblo Indians' aboriginal water
rights are currently being litigated: (1) do the Pueblo Indians
have the benefit of a reserved right, and (2) do the Pueblo Indians
have a water right recognized under Spanish law enabling them
to use water to irrigate all of their practicably irrigable acreage.
The resolution of the first issue turns in part on whether the
pueblos are Indian reservations to which the Winters doctrine
applies.
The Rio Grande pueblos were in existence when the United
States acquired sovereignty over New Mexico in 1848 pursuant to
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.lm Although the pueblos bewithin the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. The fish native to the lake must spawn in
the Truckee River, the only substantial stream flowing into the lake, in order for a natural
fishery to survive.
96. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 946
(1975) (No. 74-949), reu'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973) (involving the Ute
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Reservations in southern Colorado).
97. United States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643 (E.D. Wash., filed May 5, 1972) (involving a minimum stream flow in Chamokane Creek, a tributary to the Spokane River
on the Spokane Indian Reservation).
98. United States v. Gila Valley Irr. Dist., Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29,
1935).
99. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text infra.
100. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 2,1848,9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207 (Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo).
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came a part of the United States at that time, it appears that the
lands of the pueblos did not constitute a portion of the public
domain; in any event, no treaty, statute, or executive order has
ever designated or withdrawn the pueblos as Indian reservations.
It is arguable that this fact, however, should not bar application
of the Winters doctrine for the benefit of the Pueblo Indians.
What constitutes an Indian reservation is a question of fact, not
law, and the pueblos have always been treated as reservations in
fact by the United States.lol This pragmatic approach is supported by Arizona u. Californialozwhere the Court indicates that
the manner in which a reservation is created does not affect
the application of the Winters doctrine.lo3If the Winters doctrine
does apply to the pueblos, the reserved water rights of the Pueblo
Indians would have a priority as of 1848, the date they became
reservations under the laws of the United States.
An 1848 priority on the Rio Grande is a late priority date and
would not assure the Pueblo Indians a water right sufficient to
irrigate all their irrigable acreage. The United States, therefore,
claims that the water rights of the Pueblo Indians recognized by
Spanish law, remained valid after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.lo4The United States asserts that Spanish law recognized
not only the aboriginal right but also a right to sufficient water
to meet the Indians' future needs, including irrigation of all their
irrigable acreage.lo5New Mexico disputes this construction of
Spanish law and argues that the Pueblo Land Act,lo6which applies on its face only to the middle Rio Grande pueblos, effectively limits all the pueblo Indians' water rights to the aboriginal
use. If the federal government is correct, the Pueblo Indians al101. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1926); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 41 (1913); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1902);
Harkrader v. Goldstein, 31 Interior Dec. 87 (1901); Minnesota, 22 Interior Dec. 388 (1896);
Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, 5 8, 10 Stat. 309 (pueblo lands reserved from sale or other
supra note
disposal by the federal government). Cf. 25 U.S.C. $§ 253, 621 (1970); COHEN,
66, a t 396.
102. 373 U.S. 564 (1963).
103. Authorities cited note 54 supra.
104. The United States intervened and asserted the aboriginal claim in the consolidated northern pueblo cases presently underway in New Mexico: New Mexico ex rel.
Reynolds v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M., filed Apr. 20, 1966) [Editor's Note: the
federal district judge hearing this case recently entered an interlocutory order dated February 28, 1975, holding that the northern pueblos are not Indian reservations having a
reserved water right. The judge's order is presently under an interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.]; New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abeyeta, Civil No. 7896
(D.N.M., filed Feb. 4, 1969).
DE LEYESDE REINOSDE LOS INDIOS,
Book VI, Title 3 (this code
105. RECOPILATION
includes the Spanish system of protecting pueblo water rights).
106. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text infra.
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ready possessed a water right to irrigate all their irrigable acres
when their lands became a part of the United States, and the
Pueblo Land Act does not limit that right.
The concept of aboriginal water rights can also be applied to
nonagricultural water uses. Aboriginal rights may include the
right to maintain minimum stream flows to preserve the environment of a reservation and its fish and wildlife resources. This
claim would appear to be particularly appropriate where the Indians have relied upon those resources as a source of food and
recreation from time immemorial. In any event, the federal
government believes that it is obligated to protect the Indians'
aboriginal rights as well as all other reserved rights held for the
benefit of Indians. lo7
3. The effect of the Reclamation Act of 1902 on reserved water
rights

In order to provide "storage, diversion, and development of
waters for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands of the
West,"loS Congress enacted the Reclamation Act of 19021°9and
acts amendatory and supplementary thereto.l1° Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Bureau of Reclamation to
proceed in conformance with state law for the acquisition and
administration of water rights in the construction and operation
of reclamation projects. ll1
107. It is possible to assert that one of the sovereign's purposes when the reservations
were created was to preserve the Indians' aboriginal uses of water. Following this rationale,
the aboriginal uses of water would be a part of the reserved water right.
108. 43 U.S.C. 5 391 (1970).
109. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C.).
110. E.g., Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 5 26, 33 Stat. 225; Washoe Project Act, 43
U.S.C. 55 614, 614a-d (1970). The act authorizes the Newlands Reclamation Project,
which diverts water from the Truckee River into the Carson River watershed, thus depleting the supply of water that would have maintained Pyramid Lake, a large desert lake,
and its fishery. That lake and its fishery were arguably reserved for the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Indian Tribe and the last supplemental act contains a section which indicates a
desire to preserve the fishery that the original reclamation project was destroying. The
Indians' right to sufficient waters to preserve the F'yramid Lake fishery is currently being
litigated. See note 95 supra.
111. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act reads as follows:
[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying
out the provision of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and
nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal
Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from
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The question arises whether and to what extent congressional
action in authorizing reclamation projects affects reserved water
rights. When there is sufficient water to meet the needs of a
reclamation project, prior vested rights, and the reserved rights
of the Indians and other reservations and enclaves, there is no
conflict. If there is insufficient water for those purposes, however,
a conflict must necessarily develop. Its resolution is not readily
apparent; neither case law nor statutes speak to this subject.
Four possible alternatives present themselves. First, under a
restrictive application of section 8, the needs of reclamation projects may be filled only with unappropriated and unreserved watersY2If, after satisfying reserved and other rights with an earlier
priority, there is insufficient water remaining for an already constructed reclamation project, the blame can be placed on the
Department of the Interior and Congress for miscalculating the
feasibility of the project. This alternative would encourage full
disclosure and require a certain degree of candor in establishing
the feasibility of projects. Second, the reclamation project takes
all the water necessary to complete the project and the quantity
of reserved water is reduced accordingly. The rationale supporting this second approach is that supplementary reclamation acts
are the most recent expressions of congressional intent respecting
the water rights involved. It could be assumed that those acts
were promulgated with full awareness of conflicting rights and
with the intent that this subsequent legislation prevail over prior
federal action in the area. Third, in times of shortage, all water
is prorated. Fourth, Congress could resolve the issue between all
the users for each particular reclamation project by adopting legislation allocating the available water among prior appropriated
rights, reserved rights, and project rights. Whichever of these
solutions is adopted, it should be speedily implemented. The
impact of reclamation projects on water rights, particularly Indian rights, is an issue that affects more water users than most
other unresolved issues in this area of the law.
-

-

any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use
of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit
of the right.
Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, § 8,32 Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C.§ § 372,383 (1970)).
112. Section 8 would appear to subject reclamation project water rights to prior
existing rights, including reserved water rights, when its states that "nothing herein shall
in any way affect any right of . . . the Federal Government or of any landowner,
appropriator or user . . . ." Id.
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The United States has the authority to condemn both Indian
tribal and allotted lands for construction of a reclamation project? A restriction against alienation of Indian allotted lands
does not prohibit an allottee Indian from selling his improvements on his land to the United States and exchanging the land
United States usually acquires other
itself for other lands.""he
lands to give to tribes or individual Indians in place of the acreage
needed for a project. For example, the government gave lands in
southeastern Utah to the Navajo Tribe to replace lands flooded
by Lake Powell in the Glen Canyon Project.""
The water rights questions arising from this exchange program are varied and numerous. For example, what happens to the
reserved water rights of the lands transferred to the United
States? Were the water rights transferred to the lands received in
exchange by the Indians? Has the date of priority changed? What
is the effect of the exchange on other water users in the watershed
with vested rights at the time of transfer? Does a water right
attach to public lands added to the reservation? If so, what are
its characteristics? Is it the same as any other Indian reserved
right? If the reclamation project is to serve acquired lands as well
as public lands held in trust for the tribe, as does the Navajo
Project,"' must the right to the use of water be established pursuant to state law?
The Navajo Project was apparently given to the Navajo
Tribe as a quid pro quo for its water rights in the Colorado River
which the government stored in large part for downstream use by
non-Indian interests."' The question arises, however, whether the
tribe's water rights under the project have the same priority as
the rights to the water given up. Further, if some of the lands
acquired either by the United States for the tribe or by the tribe
itself had appurtenant water rights a t the time of acquisition,
what is the effect on the measure of the total water right of the
reservation? None of these questions has been answered. The
legislation is silent on the subject.
113. United States v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land, 162 F. Supp. 108 (D. Mont. 1957) (citing
section 9(c) of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the federal reclamation laws, and the General
Condemnation Act of 1888 as authority); Solicitor's Opinion, Dep't of the Interior, M36148 (Feb. 3, 1954) (involving the Yellowtail Dam and the Crow Indian Reservation).
114. Henkel v. United States, 237 U.S. 43 (1915).
115. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-868, 72 Stat. 1686.
116. 43 U.S.C. § 615kk (1970).
117. The Navajo Tribe also receives up to 50,000 acre-feet per year from Lake Powell
for use in the coal stream plant a t Page, Arizona.
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T h e effect of other federal statutes o n reserved water rights

The effect of specific federal legislation on the reserved water
rights of Indian reservations can best be introduced by reference
to congressional acts dealing with the Wind River Reservation
and the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Since both acts specified
that certain actions should be taken pursuant to state law in
connection with the exercise of the Indians' water right, a possible
conflict arose between the acts and their reference to state water
law on one hand and the Winters doctrine on the other.
The Wind River Act1lsprovided, in pertinent part, that certain funds be devoted to
the performance of such acts as are required by the statutes of
the State of Wyoming i n securing water rights from said State
for the irrigation of such lands as shall remain the property of
said Indians, whether located within the territory intended to be
ceded by this agreement or within the diminished reserve.llg

Another act120established irrigation systems for the allotted lands
of the Utes of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and provided
that
such irrigation systems shall be constructed and completed and
held and operated and water therefore [sic] appropriated under
the laws of the State of Utah, and the title thereto until otherwise provided by law shall be in the Secretary of the Interior in
trust for the Indians . . . .121

Notwithstanding the references in these statutes to state law,
the courts held that the statutes did not change the reserved
water right of these re~ervati0ns.l~~
The Wind River Act was interpreted in United States v. park in^.'^^ In effect, the court held that
the statutory language should not be construed as an abandonment of prior existing rights by the Indians and the taking of an
inferior right under state law unless that intent was clearly expressed.12' The court said that no such clear intent was apparent
118. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016.
119. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added).
120. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 375.
121. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
122. For decisions concerning the water rights of the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation see United States v. Cedar View Irr. Co., Equity No. 4416 (D. Utah, Mar.
18, 1929), and United States v. Dry Gulch Irr. Co., Equity No. 4427 (D. Utah, Mar. 18,
1929), wherein the court held that the reserved rights of the reservation were not affected
by the statute.
123. 18 F.2d 642 (D. Wyo. 1926).
124. In that case the court declared:
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in the Wind River Act. The court's holding comports with the
Department of the Interior's historical position that such statutes
have limited application and provide only for procedural filing
under state law for water used in the development of specific
projects, but do not limit the existence or measure of the reserved
right of the re~ervati0n.l~~
A federal statute also affects the water rights of the Pueblo
Indians. On its face, the Pueblo Land Act12' applies only to the
middle Rio Grande pueblos. The Act authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to enter into a contract with the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District, a political subdivision of New Mexico, requiring the District to recognize the Pueblo Indians' prior and
paramount right to water for the purpose of irrigating the historically irrigated acreage of the middle pueblos (approximately
8,346 acres). The Act also states that land reclaimed for the Indians (now about 12,000 acres) should have water rights on the
same basis as non-Indian lands of the same character.I2' In compliance with the Act, the Secretary entered into such a contract,
which has been followed for the past 40 years.
New Mexico contends128that all of the Pueblo Indians' water
rights within the tributary areas of the Rio Grande, not merely
those of the middle Rio Grande pueblos to which the statute
expressly applies, are limited to an amount sufficient to irrigate
the Pueblo Indians' historically irrigated acreage. The State interprets the Act's declaration, that the six middle Rio Grande
pueblos are entitled to a first right to water for their historically
irrigated acres, as an expression of congressional intent to define
the extent of the water rights of all the Rio Grande pueblos.
It is not apparent that the waters in the streams within the Indian reservation were ever specifically granted by the United States to the state of Wyoming,
although it is apparently the fact that the Indian service . . : and the officials
of the state of Wyoming . . . have cooperated along the line of taking out water
for irrigating purposes with the consent of the state. It must be assumed, however, in the absence of any specific grant, that the government has reserved
whatever rights may be necessary for the beneficial use of the government in
carrying out its previous treaty rights; those rights having become fixed and
established before an act of admission which made Wyoming a sovereign state.
Id. a t 643.
125. See Letter from Secretary of the Interior to the Attorney General, November 8,
1935 (discussing the appeal of United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th
Cir. 1939)).
126. Act of March 13, 1928, ch. 219, 45 Stat. 312.
127. Id. at 313.
128. New Mexico has articulated this argument in cases presently being litigated. See
note 104 and accompanying text supra.
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Adoption of that interpretation would prevent the various pueblos from developing much of their irrigable lands and would severely limit their economic potential.
The Department of the Interior construes the same statute
as preserving a minimum water right for the purpose of the project involved and not as limiting the Indians' reserved water
rights. If the Department is correct, the Winters doctrine could
be applied to all Pueblo Indian lands, including the lands of the
middle pueblos, despite the statute.
The statutes opening Indian reservations to entry and settlement by non-Indians have in some instances contained provisions
concerning the exercise of water rights.lZ9This article cannot discuss each of these statutes, but perhaps a general conclusion is
warranted. Although each statute must be carefully read to determine the purposes which Congress sought to fulfill by the statutory language, many of the statutes deal solely with procedural
aspects of filing claims or of giving notice and do not alter the
existence or measure of the Indians' reserved water rights.130
5. Rights of the non-Indian lessees, transferees, and entrymen
on Indian reservations
Water reserved for the benefit of Indian reservations, when
used for purposes of irrigation, are in the nature of realty and
may be appurtenant to the land. In this way Indian water rights
are much akin to state-created water rights. 131 Those rights
may be exercised by non-Indian lessees of Indian lands.132
129. E.g., Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302, as amended Act of May 29,
1908, ch. 216, § 15, 35 Stat. 448 (opening Flathead Indian Reservation to settlement and
authorizing the Flathead Indian Irrigation Project to conditionally serve non-Indians); Act
of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1035 (opening Blackfeet Indian Reservation to settlement by non-Indians); Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80 (opening Colville
Indian Reservation to entry by non-Indians).
130. For example, the statute opening the Blackfeet Indian Reservation for entry by
non-Indians, Act of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285,34 Stat. 1035, when considered in connection
with a subsequent statute, Act of May 18, 1916, ch. 125, $ 11,39 Stat. 142, indicates that
Congress did not intend to reduce the reserved water rights held for the benefit of the
Blackfeet Indians. These statutes should be interpreted in light of the confusion surrounding Indian water rights at the time they were enacted. In 1907, the Winters case was just
being litigated. Therefore, it is necessary to look a t what Congress did both before Winters
(the 1907 Act) and after Winters (the 1916 Act) in order to determine the congressional
intent concerning the Indians' reserved water rights.
131. Special Master, supra note 35, at 263,266. For a discussion of the nature of statecreated water rights see note 21 supra.
132. Special Master, supra note 35, a t 266; Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th
Cir. 1921).
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Further, the Supreme Court has held that the rights of Indians
on the Crow Indian Reservation to use water on the allotted lands
of that reservation passed with those lands into the hands of nonIndian transferees.133Although the Supreme Court did not discuss
how the amount of water transferred to the non-Indian should be
determined,134one lower court has held that either the amount of
water which was put to use at the time of the transfer, or the
amount that may be put to use by reasonable diligence within a
reasonable time after the transfer, constitutes the proper measure.135Although this rule works well when it is an agricultural
enterprise that is under development, it does not always work
well in other circumstances. For example, the rule is not an effective means of measuring the transferee's water right when the
transferee develops a subdivision on formerly allotted Indian
lands overlying a groundwater basin, where the groundwater
basin serves not only the subdivision but also adjacent Indian
lands
There has never been a determination made with respect to
the reserved water rights of non-Indian lands within the exterior
boundaries of an Indian reservation which were entered by nonIndians pursuant to federal statutes.137Generally, the acts opening the Indian reservations to settlement by non-Indians indicate
that the entrymen shall follow the provisions of state law in acquiring their water rights and that such water rights are subject
to existing rights. Nevertheless, the question arises whether a
133. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). This case, dealing with a treaty
which provided for the allotment of the lands of that reservation to individual Indians,
held that the water right was appurtenant to the allotted land. Some authorities claim
that the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended 25 U.S.C. $$
331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 381 (1970), accomplishes the same thing for all of the allotted
Indian reservations. They urge that the water rights of all Indian allottees vest in the
allottee, become appurtenant to the allotment, and thereafter pass with the land. Others
deny that such an effect is a necessary interpretation of the General Allotment Act despite
the above case. They claim that all water rights belong to the tribe and do not attach to
the land. Following this latter point of view, the reserved water right does not vest in the
allottee and he cannot transfer it.
134. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939).
135. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
136. A standard as to the measure of transferees' water rights in such circumstances
may be developed by the court in United States v. Be1 Bay Community & Water Ass'n,
Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23, 1971). In that case the United States,
under the authority of $ 7 of the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. $ 381 (1970), and under
the United States' general trust responsibility, is claiming the exclusive authority to
control and administer the diversion of water from the groundwater basin underlying the
tribal, alloted, and formerly alloted lands (now owned by non-Indians) of the Lummi
Indian Reservation.
137. See, e.g., statutes cited notes 129, 130 supra.
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part of the Indians' reserved water right accompanies the entryman's land. If such a right to water does exist, a further question
arises as to who has the authority to regulate the exercise of that
right. These questions have not yet been resolved. Good grounds
exist, however, for asserting that the non-Indian entryman did
not participate in the water right reserved for the benefit of the
~ ~ are also good grounds for
Indians of the r e s e r ~ a t i 0 n . lThere
asserting that the tribe, acting jointly with the Department of the
Interior, has the authority to regulate the entrymen's rights, at
least to the extent necessary to prevent interference with the
Indians' reserved water rights.139

B. Application of the Winters Doctrine to National Parks,
Monuments, and Forests
This, and the three subsequent sections, discuss the application of the Winters doctrine to specific enclaves other than Indian
reservations. The bases for such applications were discussed
above in section I, C. The application of the Winters doctrine to
national parks, monuments, and forests may depend to a great
extent on the status of the land in question prior to its designation
as a federal area. In general, lands administered by the United
States may be classified into three categories: (1) public lands
(open to settlement, location, sale, and entry); (2) withdrawn or
reserved lands, reserved for specific purposes (carved out of the
public domain lands and not open to location, settlement, sale,
or entry); and (3) acquired lands (purchased following congressional authorization for specific federal purposes). The rights to
water on the public domain are discussed in section 11, D infra.
Subsection 1 of this section discusses water rights held by the
United States for both reserved and acquired lands. Subsection
2 discusses how to determine the purposes for which water was
impliedly reserved for use in national parks, monuments, and
forests. Also in subsection 2, an important pending case dealing
138. Those grounds are found in 43 U.S.C. $ 5 321-23, 661, which provide that a
patentee of land gets no water rights by virtue of this patent. See also California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (determining that the land
and water had been separated in the public lands of the West). It appears that even
though reservations are not public lands, water rights for use on those opened lands by
the non-Indian were to be acquired pursuant to public land law by compliance with state
law; the entryman's priority to the use of water would be subject to existing rights. Hence
their rights, however acquired, would be junior to the Indians' prior existing rights on that
reservation.
139. For a discussion of that authority see section In, C, 2, b infra.
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with this issue, United States v. Cappaert,140is examined in some
detail.
1. T h e e f f e c t of t h e prior status of lands in national parks,
monuments, and forests

a. Reserved and withdrawn lands. With few exceptions, the
national parks, monuments, and forests were created by Congress
through the enactment of express statutes delineating the lands
to be included; most of those lands were withdrawn from the
public domain. Reservations, whether Indian reservations, parks,
monuments, or forests, which have been exclusively or primarily
created by withdrawal from public lands, have water rights under
the reservation doctrine1" sufficient to fulfill the purposes for
which the reservations were created. There is, however, one limitation on the reserved water rights of withdrawn lands that also
limits any reserved rights for acquired lands. The reservation of
water, either express or implied, by the federal sovereign is limited to the extent that water rights have already been acquired
pursuant to state law. Thus, where private parties have gone
upon the waterways or the public lands and acquired water rights
under state law prior to the time of reservation or acquisition by
the federal government, any federally reserved rights are subject
to the prior state-granted rights held by those private parties.142
b. Acquired lands. Many areas administered by the National Park Service are checkerboarded with lands once privately
held but subsequently acquired from their private owners by the
Secretary of the Interior under the power of eminent domain for
parks, monuments, and other national recreation areas. Indeed,
when the various parks were created and their boundaries de140. 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107,
74-1304).
141. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text. The Winters doctrine has its
origins in cases involving an implied reservation of water associated with reserved public
lands. See, e.g., United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971)
(national forest and public lands); United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5,
401 U S . 527 (1971) (national forests, parks, and recreation areas); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Indian reservations, fish and wildlife refuges, national forests, and
recreation areas); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Pelton Dam, a power site withdrawal); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (Indian reservation); Nevada ex
rel. Shamberger v. United States, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) (military reservation);
Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah, Mar. 16, 1963) (national forest). See
also United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041
(1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304) (national monument).
142. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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fined, the Secretary was expressly directed by the statutes to
acquire the private parcels within the park boundaries. It is unclear what water rights exist for the benefit of these lands after
acquisition by the United States.
Some of these acquired lands have state-created water rights
appurtenant to them since the United States ordinarily acquires
private lands with all their appurtenances, including water. Such
appurtenant water rights, however, may not be sufficient to fulfill
the purposes for which the land was acquired. If those rights are
indeed inadequate, additional water might be obtained without
compliance with statutory law under one of three legal theories:
(1) The acquired lands have the benefit of a federally reserved water right sufficient to fulfill the purposes contemplated
a t the time of the acquisition.
(2) No federally reserved water right attaches to the acquired lands, but surrounding reserved lands enjoy a reserved
water right of sufficient magnitude to fulfill the purposes of the
park in all areas, including the water-short acquired lands.
(3) The federal sovereign may obtain additional water only
by eminent domain. 143
Two additional questions arise when the United States acquires private lands and their appurtenant water rights. First, if
the quantity of water, deemed appurtenant to the acquired lands
under state law, exceeds the amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of the federal sovereign, does the United States keep the
right to the water even though it does not use it? In other words,
may the state law doctrine of nonuse operate to limit or extinguish the federal government's right to the unused waters? Second, can the federal government change the place or nature of use
to another federal use in or out of the watershed a t will, or may
state law concerning changes in place and nature of use limit the
federal government's prerogative^?'^^ These questions remain
generally unresolved.

The determination of the various purposes for creating parks,
monuments, and other reservations: a discussion of United States
v. Cappaert

2.

In national parks, monuments, forests, and the like, the federal government has reserved water for greatly varying purposes.
143. For a discussion of the federal sovereign's power of eminent domain see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 W A S HL.. REV.553 (1972).
144. The change of place and nature of use issue is discussed in section 11, F infra.
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For example, national parks and monuments have been created
for recreation, protection and conservation of fish and wildlife,
and preservation of natural phenomena; national forests, for recreation, grazing, production of timber, and other uses under the
multiple-use concept. Other kinds of reservations were also created for widely varying purposes. The courts have not yet fully
resolved a crucial issue in this area: how does one identify those
purposes of the sovereign which require an implied reservation of
water? The currently pending case of United States v. C ~ p p a e r t ~ ~ ~
provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve some
of the uncertainty surrounding this and several other issues.t46
In 1952, a Presidential proclamation, issued pursuant to the
Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities,14' withdrew 40
acres of a detached portion of the Death Valley National Monument, together with a remarkable underground pool of water
known as Devil's Hole. The pool is the natural habitat of a peculiar species of tiny desert fish, known as pupfish (cyprinodon
diabolis), found nowhere else in the world. The fish eat and reproduce on a sloping natural rock shelf near the water's surface
in Devil's Hole. In 1968 the Cappaerts, who had recently acquired
lands from Nevada and exchanged certain lands with the United
States, began substantial groundwater pumping pursuant to
Nevada state law in order to support a new ranching venture.
Because the Cappaerts were pumping water from the same underground formation that supplied water to Devil's Hole, the
water in that pool receded and exposed part of the natural stone
shelf. As a consequence, the pupfish population declined precipitously.
The Cappaerts, in compliance with the laws of Nevada, had
filed an application to appropriate the groundwaters underlying
their lands. The National Park Service made a voluntary appearance in the administrative hearings held by Nevada. The Park
Service did not introduce any evidence with respect to a federal
reserved right to the water, but rather addressed itself to the fish
145. 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107,
74-1304).
146. Some of the other issues involved in this case are: (1) what is the effect of the
Winters doctrine on groundwater; (2) do state administrative officers have the authority
to administer, control, or limit the federal government's use of reserved water; and (3) if
a federal agency participates voluntarily in a state administrative proceeding, is the
United States required thereafter to follow state procedure in establishing, exercising, and
protecting its water right? For a discussion concerning the administrative authority over
reserved water rights see section III, C infra.
147. 16 U.S.C. 5 431 (1970).
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and their endangered status, seeking to have the decision delayed
until the survival of the fish could be studied further. The state
engineer denied the request and issued the applications.
The United States sought an injunction compelling the Cappaerts to reduce their water use to t h extent necessary to prevent
lowering the water table and exposing the natural rock shelf. The
federal district court recognized the pupfish as an endangered
species and found that the reduced water level caused by the
pumping threatened their extinction. It thereupon entered a preliminary injunction limiting the Cappaerts' water use and appointed a special master to control the pumping of water. Soon
thereafter, pursuant to direction from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,148the district court entered a permanent i n j u n c t i ~ n . ' ~ ~
On appeal from the permanent injunction, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision and directed the lower court to retain jurisdiction in order to determine
exactly what level of water is required to assure the survival of
the pupfish. The court held, despite the contention of the Cappaerts and Nevada to the contrary, that the Winters doctrine
applies to groundwater as well as surface water.'" In reaching its
decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that the fundamental
purpose of the reservation of Devil's Hole was to assure that the
pool would not suffer changes in the condition that existed at the
time of the 1952 Presidential proclamation; that condition included the pool's unique habitat in which the pupfish live. The
court stated that the proclamation referred to the significant contribution of the pupfish to the scientific importance of Devil's
Hole and that by the proclamation the United States impliedly
insured "enough groundwater to assure preservation of the pupfish." The court believed that its conclusion that the Presidential
proclamation manifested an intent to reserve the water was rein148. 483 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1973).
149. 375 F. Supp. 456 (D. Nev. 1974).
150. 508 F.2d a t 317. The court cited Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States,
165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) and
Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968), for the proposition that the,
Winters doctrine applies to groundwater. The court also noted that Nevada law provides
for the acquisition of rights for the use of groundwater just as readily as for the acquisition
of rights to surface water.
It is interesting to note that no party has referred to interlocutory decree No. 41, dated
April 1,1966, as amended on June 27, 1968, in United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist.,
165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), reu'd in part, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965) (Civil No.
1247, filed Jan. 25, 1951). The amended decree established reserved water rights for Indian
reservations in substantial groundwater basins along the Santa Margarita River in southern California.
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forced by the act establishing the National Park Service,151
"which states t h a t 'the fundamental purpose' of all national
parks and monuments is '. . . to conserve the scenery . . . and
the wildlife therein . . . by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.' "152 Thus, the
court identified the purpose of the sovereign that supported an
implied intent to reserve water from several interrelated statutes
and actions of the federal government. Hence, it appears that the
search for the purposes of the federal sovereign may include those
pertinent statutes or other documents which were in existence at
the time of the withdrawal.
The court also rejected the Cappaerts' claim that the government should be estopped from enjoining them due to its knowledge a t the time it transferred certain lands to them that they
intended to undertake substantial pumping of water. Nevada had
contended that the federal government could not acquire groundwater except in conformity with state law. The court rejected that
argument and, citing FPC v. 0regon,lS3held that state water laws
do not apply to federal reservations.
The Cappaert case is currently pending before the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari. Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
New Mexico, Wyoming, and Arizona have appeared as amici
curiae in support of the position of the appellants.lS4Each of the
151. 16 U.S.C. 8 1 (1970).
152. 508 F.2d a t 318.
153. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
154. The states are concerned with the following questions: (1) Did Congress intend
under the Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970), tovest
the President with authority to reserve water for the purpose of protecting an endangered
species? (2) Can the federal government invoke the reservation doctrine to assert superior
rights to groundwater, so as to enjoin a landowner adjacent to the federal lands from
pumping water from beneath his land pursuant to state-granted well permits? (3) Should
the federal government be barred under the principles of res judicata from seeking to
litigate in a subsequent judicial action issues decided in a state administrative proceeding
in which it participated and from which it failed to appeal? Brief for States as Amici
Curiae a t 7, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U S . 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304).
Arizona has submitted a separate brief requesting determination of essentially the
same questions. It also points out the difference that occurs in the applicati~nof Arizona's
water law which does not provide for the control and administration of the use of that
portion of groundwater described as percolating waters. Arizona attempts to differentiate
such waters from the waters of recognizable and established streams or flows, both surface
and underground. Brief for Arizona as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U S .
1041 (1975) (NOS.74-1107, 74-1304).
With respect to the application of the Winters doctrine to groundwater, hydrologists
have shown that all water in a watershed is in hydrologic continuity. Sometimes it is on
the surface, and sometimes it is percolating more or less slowly through the ground, but
in most instances it is moving downhill. Groundwater simply moves slower than surface
streams and fills the swales and depressions within a watershed above bedrock; a t times
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states alleges that extending the Winters doctrine to groundwater
will render administration of the groundwater within those states
impossible. The states contend that catastrophic effects on the
various states and their economic conditions will result if the
decision is not overturned. The United States counters by asserting that the question presented is whether the sovereign, by virtue of the Presidential proclamation declaring Devil's Hole to be
a national monument, reserved sufficient underground water to
preserve the pool and the pupfish. The government points out
that it has not requested, nor have the courts required, that petitioners restore the pool to its natural level or completely terminate their pumping operations. The injunction merely restrains
the Cappaerts from lowering the water level to a point that endangers the fish. It rejects the states' claims of catastrophe and
denies that the state administrative agencies have jurisdiction
over federal reserved water rights.
C. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Fish and Wildlife
Areas Reserved by the United States
The United States Supreme Court, in Arizona v.
C a l i f ~ r n i a ,decreed
'~~
that specific quantities of water from the
Colorado River were reserved from unappropriated water to fulfill
the purposes of the Havasu and Imperial Wildlife Refuges in
Water was also reserved for the Cibola
Arizona and Ca1if0rnia.l~~
Refuge, located in both states, but a specific quantity was not
named because the refuge was still in the planning stage. In each
of these wildlife refuges the date of withdrawal from the public
domain established the respective water priority date.lJ7
1. Activities of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife

The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife has taken a pecuit rises to the surface and, in some cases, disappears again in varying amounts depending
upon the size and configuration of underground basins in the area and the consistency of
the materials through which the underground water must move. Therefore, all water in a
given watershed should be treated as a single body of water and the Winters doctrine, in
order to effectively protect reserved rights, should be applied to surface and groundwater
alike. The courts and engineers have and do consistently develop reliable knowledge of
various groundwater basins and determine their safe yield in connection with the various
sources of recharge in the watershed.
155. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
156. Id. a t 601; Special Master, supra note 35, a t 296-98.
157. It is important to remember that some refuges contain acquired lands. Although
the water rights appurtenant to such lands are incorporated into the refuge's operation,
state law is considered applicable to such rights. Whether these acquired lands also have
reserved water rights is an important unresolved question. See section 11, B, 1, b supra.
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liarly independent approach to reserved water rights. When a
refuge under its jurisdiction does not have recorded water rights,
the Bureau generally files a notice with the appropriate state
agency in order to inform the state of the government's claim to
reserved water rights. Such notice specifically states that it does
not constitute a waiver of any federal rights. No action has yet
been taken by the states either to deny or to recognize water
rights claimed by the Bureau. Some states, however, have responded by issuing state water right permits based upon actual
use, with a priority as of the date of filing. The Bureau contends
that these permits do not alter the priority date or the amount of
the federal reserved water rights.
In addition to filing with the state, the Bureau has its own
representatives appear in state administrative hearings concerning conflicting water rights. The Department of the Interior
claims that such appearances do not recognize the jurisdiction of
the state administrative officer over the reserved right. At times
the Bureau also prepares and files documents in pending water
rights hearings, but it asserts that such action is taken as a matter
of comity for communicating information concerning the reserved
rights and that no adjudication of those rights occurs. The Department of Justice is the only department of the federal government that may initiate an adjudication of water rights reserved
by the United States. It generally does so only at the specific
request of the affected federal agency or department. Thus, an
adjudication of a reserved water right cannot occur by a federal
agency or department communicating information to a state
administrative officer.

The measure of the reserved water right and full development
of the refuge

2.

The measure of the federal reserved water right for a fish or
wildlife refuge should be the amount of water necessary to meet
the minimum consumptive use on the lands and facilities involved. This includes amounts sufficient to meet the water requirements of the refuge when fully developed. The actual
amount of the reserved right needs to be kept open-ended until
full development of the habitat or refuge has been achieved. Since
it takes many years to fully develop a refuge, few refuges have
reached full development, and any present estimates of the measure of the reserved water right must include prospective use.
This has not always been done. The water rights established for
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certain refuges in Arizona v. California1" do not adequately fill
those refuges' requirements; the amount of consumptive use was
determined without correctly estimating evaporation and seepage
losses.
3. Minimum stream flows

Whether a right exists to maintain minimum stream flows
for recreational fisheries and wild fowl habitats constituting part
of a federal project159remains an unresolved issue. Its resolution
is currently being sought by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife. The right to a maintained minimum flow has, in the
past, been based on the language of the statute authorizing the
project or on an agreement with the entity operating the project,
such as the Bureau of Reclamation. As various streams, however,
become the subject of adjudicative action, this right to a minimum stream flow should be asserted and then incorporated as
part of the final decree in order to preserve the right and to
establish its position in the ladder of priorities. The existence of
this right may be contested because wildlife, fishery, and recreational uses historically have not been recognized as beneficial
uses by most Western States. Recent developments in water law,
however, may reverse this trend. Colorado and Washington have
adopted statutes recognizing wildlife, fishery, and recreational
uses as beneficial uses, thus enabling the state to establish a right
to a minimum stream flow in various selected streams.lBO

D. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Lands
of the Public Domain
T h e effect of statutes on federal reserved rights to water on
the public domain
The public domain has always been utilized as a source of
forage for livestock and game. Access to water, therefore, has been
a critical part of the right to use public lands. In recognition of
this fact, Congress in 1916 provided that lands containing waterholes or other bodies of water needed or used by the public for
watering purposes may be reserved. While so reserved, the lands
1.

158. 373 U.S. at 601; Special Master, supra note 35, at 292-300.
159. E.g., Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and San Juan-Chama Reclamation Project, 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii-yy (1970).
160. COLO.REV.STAT.ANN. § 37-92-103(4) (1973); WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 90.22.010
(Supp. 1974). In general, the states select those streams in which the public interest
requires the maintenance of minimum flow. Thereafter, the right to appropriate water
from those streams is limited.
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are to "[ble kept and held open to the public use for such purposes under such general rules and regulations as the Secretary
of the Interior may prescribe . . . ."lsl In other words, under this
Act, water may be expressly reserved, not for use on reserved or
withdrawn lands, but for the preservation of the public's right of
access to waters on the public domain. In 1925, the Secretary of
the Interior was authorized by a second actls2to issue permits for
a period of up to 20 years for the erection of bath houses, hotels,
or other improvements upon
suitable spaces or tracts of land near or adjacent to mineral,
medicinal, or other springs which are located upon unreserved
public lands or public lands which have been withdrawn for the
protection of such springs . . . .183

Such permits have been issued in order that service could be
rendered to the general public. Thus, even though there is no case
specifically treating the subject, it appears that when the Secretary of the Interior reserves public watering holes or issues permits for development of medicinal springs, sufficient water is
reserved on the public domain to fulfill the purposes stated in the
document of reservation or in the permit. The reserved water
rights created pursuant to these statutes are entitled to the same
protection as other federal reserved rights.
At times there has been discussion of a possible claim for a
federally reserved water right on the public domain arising out of
the Taylor Grazing Act,ls4 which contains language concerning
conservation, flood control, cooperation with those engaged in
conservation and propagation of wildlife, and hunting and fishing.165The intent of the sovereign to reserve water is allegedly
found in the language of the General Withdrawal Order1" issued
under the Taylor Grazing Act on November 26, 1934. Section 3
of that Act,lB7however, specifically negates any intention to re161. 43 U.S.C. § 300 (1970). For the order of the Secretary of the Interior withdrawing
the lands and waters of public waterholes see 51 Interior Dec. 457 (1926).
162. 43 U.S.C. 9 971 (1970).
163. Id.
164. 43 U.S.C. $ $ 315 et seq. (1970).
165. 43 U.S.C. $ 315 (1970).
166. Exec. Order No. 6910, 3 C.F.R. 297.11 (1938).
167. 43 U.S.C. 9 315b (1970). That section states:
[Nlothing in this subchapter shall be construed or administered in any
way to diminish or impair any right to the possession and use of water for
mining, agriculture, manufacturing, or other purposes which has heretofore
vested or accrued under existing law validly affecting the public lands or which
may be hereafter initiated or acquired and maintained in accordance with such
law.
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serve water under the Act. It is the position of the Department
of the Interior that the Taylor Grazing Act does not reserve water
for use on the public domain.ls8
Another argument attempting to establish a federal reserved
water right on the public domain is based on the Act of September 19, 1964Y9The 1964 Act does not mention water; rather, it
classifies lands for fish and wildlife development, outdoor recreation, timber production, watershed protection, and wilderness
preservation. It has been argued that the 1964 Act impliedly reserves water, since the express purposes of the Act cannot otherwise be fulfilled. The Department of the Interior recently rejected
that argument in a letter to the Department of Justice,170stating
that the Act must be interpreted "consistent with and supplemental to" the entire Taylor Grazing Act, including the water
clause in section 3.171The Department of the Interior, in arriving
at its decision, drew analogies to the water clause of the Reclamation
and to section 27 of the Federal Power
Creation of federal water rights by application to beneficial
uses upon the public domain

2.

Federal water rights on the public domain may be created
when the federal sovereign, without filing for a water right under
state law, actually applies water to a beneficial use, such as the
construction of a small flood control structure, the construction
of a debris basin on a stream, or the creation of a wildlife watering
pond.174The priority of these water rights would apparently be the
date of first use. The status of these federal water rights, if such
exist, and the authority of the Secretary to reserve water in this
manner have never been adjudicated in court. Perhaps they never
will, because of the minimal amount of water involved and the
obvious benefits to the public. Nevertheless, where an adjudica168. Letter from Raymond C. Coulter, Deputy Solicitor, Department of the Interior,
to Kent Frizzel, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, August 9, 1972.
169. 43 U.S.C. $5 1411-18 (1970).
170. Letter cited note 168 supra.
171. 43 U.S.C. 4 315b (1970).
172. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1970).
173. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1970). The Department's letter, cited in note 168 supra, included the following authority: Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U S . 275, 291 (1958)
(construing 4 8 of the Reclamation Act); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444 (1955); California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (construing the
Federal Power Act.).
174. Authority for applying the water for such uses can be found in the general duties
imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (19491953 Comp.); 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
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tion of rights within a watershed is contemplated, these rights
should be claimed along with other federal reserved rights to
avoid future uncertainty as to the validity of such rights.
3. Summary

The authorities on the subject indicate that, except for public waterholes and medicinal springs, the United States probably
will not claim that it intended to impliedly reserve waters on the
public domain for present and future uses under the Winters
doctrine. This position, however, does not appear to prevent the
sovereign from applying unappropriated water to a beneficial use
and thereby establishing a right to it. The only question is
whether the federal sovereign must comply with state law to perfect rights acquired in this manner.

E. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Military Reservations
The Federal Constitution specifically provides for federal
reservations for the use of the armed f 0 r ~ e s . The
l ~ ~ right of the
United States to use as much water as desired for these military
reservations went uncontested for many years. The military is
just becoming aware, however, of the many implications of applying the Winters doctrine to the operation of its various military
reservations. This new awareness, demonstrated in part by recent
articles in The Army Lawyer discussing the water rights of military reservations,176is the result of two recent occurrences. First,
litigation in the Colorado state courts177is adjudicating all rights
to the use of water in each watershed in that state. That adjudication involves the water rights of various military reservations,
including the Air Force Academy. Second, there is a growing
demand on the nation's water supply which may limit the water
175. U.S. CONST.art. I, $ 8, c1. 17 provides:
The Congress shall have Power . . . [tlo exercise exclusive Legislation in
all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings . . . .
176. E.g., Zimmerman, Protecting the Army's Water Rights, 2 THEARMYLAWYER
11
(1972).
177. See, e.g., United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
Colorado is systematically adjudicating all water rights in each watershed pursuant to
recent legislation and is suing the United States pursuant to 43 U.S.C. $ 666, the McCarran Amendment. For a discussion of the jurisdictional impact of that Amendment see
sections 111, B, 1 and III, B, 2 infra.
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available for military reservations. This demand is evidenced in
part by a recent Environmental Protection Agency report178indicating that within a few years the flow of the Potomac River may
be deficient for demands placed on it during several weeks each
summer. Recognizing this increasing demand, one eastern state,
Mississippi, has already adopted some aspects of the prior appropriation doctrine, and more are considering it.179Because of the
rapidly increasing demand for water, issues concerning federal
reserved water rights for military reservations will be increasingly
important in the Eastern States, where the doctrine of riparian
rights is applicable, as well as in the arid states of the West, where
the appropriation doctrine has traditionally been applied.lEO
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Arizona v.
CalifornialB1and United S t a t e s v. District Court for Eagle
County,lB2there is little question that the Winters doctrine is
properly applicable to military reservations. At the time of the
reservation of public lands for particular military enclaves, sufficient water was reserved to fulfill the purposes for which the
reservations were created. Nevertheless, numerous questions
dealing with the limitations on state jurisdiction, the water rights
appurtenant to acquired lands, the effect of abandonment, nonuse, and transfer, and the various purposes for which water was
reserved must be answered before the military's reserved rights
to water can be established and quantified.
1. T h e issue of state jurisdiction over the military's reserved
water rights
Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United StateslE3considered
whether it is necessary for the military to comply with the administrative provisions of state law in order to perfect and exercise
reserved water rights. Nevada ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot.
That depot was reserved from the public lands of the United
States. Thereafter, the Navy Department filed under the provisions of state law and drilled several wells for use on the enclave.
178. EPA. TECH.REP. 135, WATERSUPPLY
STUDY
OF THE POTOMAC
ESTUARY
(1971).
179. Kennard, Lectures on Law in Relation to Water Resources, Use, and Development, Institute of Water Resources, The University of Connecticut (March 29, 1967).
180. For a discussion of the development of the appropriation doctrine in the West
see section I, A supra.
181. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
182. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
183. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1960).

684

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

Following a Supreme Court decision that state law does not apply
to federal reservations,ls4 the Navy refused further compliance
with state law.lg5Nevada responded by instituting a suit seeking
a declaratory judgment that it had the right to administer and
control the use of the groundwater and that the federal government, in appropriating the water, was required to comply with
state law. The federal district court held that the United States
could not be compelled to obtain permits to use water from wells
that it had dug on property to which it had full title a t all times
since cession of the lands by Mexico.1s6
2.

Water rights of acquired lands on military reservations1s7

Recently, on the Sandia Air Force Base near Albuquerque,
New Mexico, water was put to use on a golf course for the benefit
of the officers and men of the base. The golf course is located on
acquired lands, not reserved lands. Those lands have no
184. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U S . 435 (1955).
185. The Navy had followed state law for a period of six years, until Nevada law
required it t o prove beneficial use of the water. At that time, the Navy refused further
compliance.
186. Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958),
aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). The court relied heavily on the
language of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U S . {4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and FPC v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435 (1955). The court also cited Ivanhoe In. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U S . 275
(1958), and Public Util. Comm'n of Calif. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the case.
It held that the United States had not consented to the suit and thus had not waived its
sovereign immunity. The district court had entertained the suit on the basis of the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), which waives federal sovereign immunity in suits
"for the adjudication of rights to the use of waters of a river system or other source." The
appellate court held, however, that the suit was not an attempt to adjudicate the rights
to the use of the water among the various users from the supply, but an attempt by the
state to obtain a ruling on the question of its authority to require the United States to
comply with the terms of its statutes in connection with the administration and control
of water. 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
Rights to the use of water on a military reservation were also involved in United States
v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'd in part, 347 F.2d 48
(9th Cir. 1965).That case involved the Navy-Marine Base a t Camp Pendleton, California.
The base had a historical water right as a rancho recognized under Spanish and California
water law. (The land, known as Rancho Santa Margarita, was mostly in private ownership
a t the time i t was acquired by the Navy Department as a Marine base.) An unfortunate
stipulation was made before trial that the water rights of the base were claimed pursuant
to the laws of California. The court held that no water rights could be acquired under the
laws of that state except by compliance with the terms of its statutes. The court did not
address itself to the question of the federal right to apply unappropriated water to a
beneficial use on a military reservation, nor to the question of the state's right to assert
administrative control over the exercise of the federal right.
187. For a discussion of acquired lands in national parks, monuments, and forests see
section 11, B, I, b supra.
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appurtenant water rights. The source of the water, the Rio
Grande, contains insufficient water to meet existing uses during
dry periods. The law is not clear as to the basis upon which water
may be obtained for use on acquired lands of military reservations
that do not have appurtenant water rights when acquired. The
Winters case and its progeny do not address the extension of the
Winters doctrine to acquired lands that become part of a federal
reservation. Those cases speak only of a reserved water right on
lands reserved by the sovereign from the public domain.

The military purposes for which water was reserved
A critical question arises concerning the use of reserved water
rights on military reservations: what are the purposes underlying
creation of a particular military enclave that require the use of
water? There is no question about those uses of water necessary
to carry out strictly military purposes. Rather, the controversy
centers on those uses of the water that are merely convenient, as
opposed to essential. On reservations created today, the intent to
reserve water for convenient uses such as the irrigation of golf
courses may perhaps be readily implied. But if the question is
approached from the standpoint of contemplated purposes a t the
time the older military reservations were created, the result may
be different. The creators of reservations formed prior to the present emphasis on recreational activities more than likely did not
contemplate golf as one of the uses of the enclave. Other recreational uses, such as swimming pools, however, present a more
difficult problem. As the demand for water increases, the resolution of these problems becomes imperative. An administrative
mechanism for resolving these conflicts is suggested in section III,
C infra.
3.

4.

The effect of nonuse, abandonment, or transfer

Nonuse presents a peculiar problem to military reservations.
Between wars or between periods of extensive mobilization, all
the reserved waters of a military enclave may not be utilized on
the enclave. During such periods, under the Winters doctrine, the
unused water could be put to use under the provisions of state
law. The economies of whole cities might be built upon its use.
When it becomes necessary to reactivate a base due to increased
military activity, what should be the relationship between those
water users and the United States? Under the Winters doctrine,
the United States has the right to take the water without compen-
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sation because of its prior right.lRR
This would appear to be unfair,
however, unless the amount of the reserved right was identified
in each source and notice of that right was available to developers.
In those instances where military enclaves have been abandoned or converted to nonmilitary uses, as occurred with the Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation on the California-Arizona border, what
water right accompanies the land when it passes from one federal
use to another? Where ownership of the land remains with the
federal government but the purpose for which the land is used
changes, what is the measure'or extent of the water right for the
new use? Of greater importance, what is its date of priority? Does
the date of withdrawal of the military reservation or the date of
conversion to the new use set the priority? These questions remain unresolved.
Generally, the rights to the use of water on military reservations have not been adjudicated in court because the military has
either taken unappropriated water or condemned land with existing water rights. Thus, the question of the military's right to use
the water arises only after the military reservation is abandoned
and the land passes to private ownership pursuant to an act of
Congress. At that time, the question arises whether the reserved
water right passes to the grantee with the land.'" Only one case
has addressed this issue. In the pre- Winters case of Story u.
Woolverston,190
the Montana Supreme Court held that the water
rights of a military reservation did not pass to post-abandonment
private transferees, since those rights were not expressly conveyed. lgl
188. See generally United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963).
189. If this question is answered in the affirmative, a further, more complex question
arises: With what part of the land of the enclave will the water be transferred-all parts
or only that part where the military actually used the water?
190. 31 Mont. 546, 78 P. 589 (1904).
191. The Montana Supreme Court stated:
The only inference is that the government, when it abandoned the reservation,
intended that the water should continue to flow in its natural channel, and to
be subject to appropriation by any one who should take it and use it for beneficial purposes, possibly upon land included within the reservation. Had the
government desired so to do, it could have granted the right to the use of the
water in express terms, but this it did not do.
31 Mont. a t 355, 78 P. a t 590.
It is interesting to note that when the Winters case was before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1906, that court relied in part on the Woolverston decision in reaching the
conclusion that a reserved water right existed for the benefit of an Indian reservation. The
court quoted the following language from Woolverston:
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F.

Changes in the Place and Nature of Use
of Reserved Water Rights

After a measure of the amount of water impliedly reserved
for use on an Indian reservation or enclave of the United States
has been established by decree, permit, or otherwise, what may
the Indian tribe or the United States do with the water? Are they
restricted to that use contemplated at the time of the creation of
the reservation as recognized in the permit or decree? Or may the
Indians or the federal government change the place and nature
of the use of the reserved water? The emerging development of
Indian reservations, particularly in the field of energy resources,
the extension of the Winters doctrine to other federal enclaves,
and the current attempts to establish a national land and water
use policy, such as that contemplated in the Water Resources
Planning Actlg2and the Western United States Water Plan
Study,lg3are giving this issue increased importance.
Before this issue can be fully resolved, two preliminary but
fundamental questions must be answered. First, who is to decide
the issue, state courts and state administrative bodies or federal
courts and federal agencies? Second, what substantive law, state
or federal, applies? The author has treated these questions elsewhere.lg4Suffice it to say here that these issues remain primarily
unresolved.

Winters and its progeny recognize the power of the federal
Prior to the time of settlement upon the lands in question, and prior to the
appropriation of the waters of Bear creek by any one, both the land and the
water were the property of the government. When the government established
the reservation, it owned both the land included therein and all the water
running in the various nearby streams to which it had not yielded title. It was
therefore unnecessary for the government to "appropriate" the water. It owned
it already. All it had to do was to take it and use it.
Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 747 (9th Cir. 1906).
192. 42 U.S.C. $5 1962 et seq. (1970).
193. Authorized in 43 U.S.C. 5 1511 (1970), a part of the Colorado River Basin Project
Act.
194. Ranquist, The Effect of Changes in Place and Nature of Use of Indian Rights to
Water Reserved Under the "Winters Doctrine, 5 NAT. RES. LAW.34 (1972). This article
treats the issue solely in the context of Indian reserved water rights; generally, however,
the application of the principles discussed is similar to non-Indian reservations. The major
differences between Indian and non-Indian reservations in this area-the applicability of
the McCarran Amendment, the jurisdiction of state courts, and the jurisdiction of state
administrative bodies-is discussed in sections III, B, 1 and III,B, 2 infra.
"
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sovereign to reserve the use of water to fulfill its purposes. Interestingly, the Constitution does not expressly address the power of
the United States over water, nor has Congress adopted any legislation on the subject of the federal government's power to reserve
water for its uses, other than perhaps the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act.lg5Nevertheless, the courts, for more than half a century,
have held that the federal government derives the power to control and administer the water resources of the public lands from
the property clause196of the Federal Constitution.lg7In 1963, the
commerce clause was cited for the first time as an additional
basis for the exercise of the power of the federal government to
reserve water. The Supreme Court stated:
We have no doubt about the power of the United States under
these clauses [commerce and property] to reserve water rights
for its reservations and its property.lg8

Although Congress has not specifically legislated in the area
of reserved water rights, it has exercised its authority to develop
programs involving the use of unreserved water.lg9Some of those
programs impinge upon the states' authority over water. For example, section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 makes the water
rights of project beneficiaries appurtenant to their lands, regardless of state law.200As noted above, the judicially created Winters
doctrine constitutes a large portion of federal law concerning the
use of water. Under it the courts have held that the reservation
of land by the federal government may manifest an intent to
195. 16 U.S.C. $§ 1271-87 (1970). This Act preserves, and thus in a sense reserves,
certain rivers in their "free-flowing condition" and incorporates those rivers into a national
wild and scenic rivers system. Hence, sufficient water to maintain that "condition" is
apparently reserved.
196. U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 3.
197. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593, 597-98 (1963). The property
clause has also been used to affirm federal authority to build irrigation projects which
serve federal lands, United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184-185 (1935), although the
authority of the states to administer and control the use of water among their citizens was
granted by Congress to the states almost a century ago. See text accompanying notes 620 supra.
198. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593, 598 (1963).
Other possible constitutional sources of federal authority over water are the general
welfare clause, U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 1; the treaty clause, U.S. CONST.art. 11, 4 2, cl.
2; and the interstate relations clause, U.S. CONST.art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which requires the
consent of Congress to any compact between states. See F. TRELEASE,
supra note 48.
199. See, e.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 9 9 797(e)-809 (1970); Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. $9 1001-08 (1970); Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C. 9 321 (1970); Reclamation Act
of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. $ 372 (1970).
200. Reclamation Act of 1902, 4 8, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1970).
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reserve water to fulfill the purposes underlying the creation of the
enclave or reservation. That intent is effectuated by recognition
of a reserved right to the use of water.lo1The recognition of the
existence of that right, however, has often not occurred until long
after creation of the reservation.202Further, the extent of the right
has in many cases remained uncertain even after its existence has
been recognized.lo3Thus, the Winters doctrine has inevitably
come into conflict with state water law. In this conflict, the power
of the federal sovereign has been recognized as supreme.204The
effect of federal supremacy on state-created private rights to the
use of water has been stated in these terms:
A state cannot create or give to a n individual a right that would
permit interference with a federal power, project or water use.
Such a right cannot rise above the powers of the granting authority, and just as the states are limited by federal supremacy,
so are the private rights stemming from them.205

The Western States have claimed plenary authority to control all uses of water within their boundaries. They have diligently opposed the existence and expansion of the Winters doctrine.lo6Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
C a l i f ~ r n i a as
, ~ ~explained
~
in Eagle County,208established that
federal and Indian reserved water rights do exist and that those
rights are controlled and administered by federal law.log
In summary, state law apparently controls the acquisition
201. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
202. The reserved water rights of reservations, other than Indian reservations and
perhaps military reservations, were not recognized or discussed by the courts until the
decision of the special master in Arizona v. California in December of 1960, which was
later adopted by the Supreme Court. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
203. Part of the uncertainty concerning the extent of the right arises because the
federal or Indian user may expand the use of water to meet future needs within the purpose
for which the reservation was created. United States v. District Court for Eagle County,
401 U.S. 520 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Ahtanum
Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924
(1965).
supra note 48, a t 56-59.
204. F. TRELEASE,
205. Id. a t 70; United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899); see
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 586 (1963).
206. Briefs for States as Amici Curiae, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U.S. 1041
(1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304);Briefs for States as Amici Curiae, United States v. District
Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Briefs for States as Parties and Amici Curiae,
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
207. 373 U S . 546 (1963).
208. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
209. Id. a t 522-23.
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and administration of water rights within state boundaries with
the following exceptions:
(1) Where a prior right to water from an interstate stream
is acquired by a user in one state by compliance with that state's
law, federal law will protect the prior right2" against claims by a
water user in another state to the extent that the right is within
the amount of the first state's apportioned share of the steam.lll
(2) Where the federal sovereign has imposed a limitation or
qualification upon the applicability of state law to water rights
in the construction or operation of federal projects and programs,
federal law governs.212
(3) Where the federal sovereign has withdrawn lands from
the public domain for purposes requiring the use of water, sufficient water from streams which arise upon, border, flow through,
or underlie the withdrawn lands may be expressly or impliedly
reserved to fulfill the purposes of the reservation or enclave.l13The
resulting reserved water rights are established and controlled by
federal law."' Water rights obtained pursuant to state law prior
to the creation of the reservation or enclave, however, are prior
to the federal reserved right and cannot be taken unless condemned. All private rights acquired after the date of creation of
the reservation are inferior and junior to the reserved water
(4) Where the aboriginal rights of an Indian tribe to the use
of water are involved, federal law protects that right.216
The following three subsections discuss legislative, judicial,
210. Howell v. Johnson, 89 F. 556, 557-58 (C.C.D. Mont. 1898).
211. Cf. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
212. See, e-g., Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1970) (water rights of
reclamation project beneficiaries made appurtenant to their lands, regardless of state
law); Federal Power Act § 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1970) (water rights acquired pursuant to
state law may be divested by action of the Federal Power Commission a t the end of the
license period as in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 42128 (1940)). Pursuant to the latter statute, the water rights necessary to the operation of a
project apparently may be recaptured by the United States a t the end of the license period
or awarded by the Federal Power Commission to a competing power or non-power applicant pursuant to § 15 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 808. The divestiture is subject to the licensee
recovering his net investment in the assets of the project, either from the operations during
the project or by payment a t the end of the license period. 16 U.S.C. § § 807, 808 (1970).
213. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U S . 520, 522 (1971);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963).
214. See notes 207-09 and accompanying text supra.
215. Arizona v. California, 373 U S . 546, 600 (1963); cf. United States v. District
Court for Eagle County, 401 U S . 520 (1971).
216. United States v. Gila Valley Irr. Dist., Globe Equity, No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29,
1935). Aboriginal watei rights are discussed in section IT, A, 2 supra.
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and administrative power over the third category of water rights
governed by federal law-the reserved rights of withdrawn lands.
Subsection C, dealing with the administrative power of the states
and the federal government, proposes the establishment of federal administrative machinery under existing federal authority to
resolve the numerous unsettled issues of law and fact which pervade this area of the law.

A. Legislative Authority over Reserved Water Rights
1. Reserved water rights of Indians
The special master in Arizona v. California found that water
rights for Indian reservations, depending upon the use to which
the water is put, are appurtenant in nature and have characteristics similar to state water rights.217If this is correct, the water
rights of the various reservations held for irrigation purposes are
appurtenant to the land those rights were reserved to serve, and
reserved water rights, like other water rights, are in the nature of
realty. Thus, the legislative authority of Congress over Indian
water rights is similar to its authority over Indian lands. In this
context, it should be noted that Congress has plenary authority
over tribal lands of Indian reservations.218
The power of Congress extends from the control of the use of the
lands, through the grant of adverse interests in the lands, to the
outright sale and removal of the Indians' interest. And this is
true, whether or not the lands are disposed of for public or
private purposes.*19

Plenary authority, however, does not mean absolute power; the
exercise of the power must be founded upon some reasonable
basis, and the Indians must be given just compensation for their
lands.220F'urther, the congressional power is "subject to constitutional limitations and does not enable the government to give the
lands of one tribe or band to another, or to deal with them as its
om."221

Congress also has legislative authority over lands held by
individual Indians, although it is more limited:
217. Special Master, supra note 35, at 266.
218. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485-86 (1899); cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U S . 665, 670-71 (1912).
INDIAN
LAW 36 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
219. U.S. DEP'TOF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
LAW].
FEDERAL
INDIAN
220. Id. at 37; see United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
221. Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 357-76 (1937).
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The power of Congress over individual lands, while less sweeping than its power over tribal lands, is clearly broad enough to
cover supervision of the alienation of individual lands.222

Congress may by statute enhance or inhibit the exercise and
enjoyment of Indian water rights. For example, Congress has denied to the various states legislative, judicial, and administrative
jurisdiction over the Indians' lands and reserved water rights,
principally because those lands and rights are held in trust by the
United States.223
Non-Indians, acting pursuant to state law may,
however, indirectly affect Indian water rights. Indian tribes have
not had sufficient capital to construct the irrigation and other
water development projects necessary to make full use of their
reserved water. The unused reserved waters continue to flow in
the steams and thus become subject to use by non-Indians pursuant to state law. These non-Indian users may expend substantial capital to expand their operations in reliance upon the presence of the water. When this occurs, recovery of the water by the
The failure to
Indians may become difficult, if not impossible.224
quantify reserved rights in each watershed contributes significantly to this problem. If the problem is not resolved, the expansion of use pursuant to state law may in reality have a serious
adverse effect on Indian water rights in the long term, although
the states themselves lack statutory authority over reserved
rights.
2. Reserved water rights of other federal reservations and
enclaves

While joint federal-state jurisdiction is the rule with respect
to most federal lands other than Indian reservations, article I,
-

222. FEDERAL
INDIAN
LAW,supra note 219, at 40.
223. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970) grants to the states jurisdiction over
civil actions to which Indians are parties, but 28 U.S.C. 9 1360(b) (1970) expressly
provides:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation
of any real or personal property, including water right, belonging to any Indian
or any Indian tribe, band or community that is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use
of such property in a manner inconsistent with any federal treaty, agreement,
or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
See also United States v. Morrison, 203 F. 364, 366 (C.C.D. Colo. 1901) (explaining in
dictum the trust relationship of the Indians and the United States).
224. See Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Right to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY
MT. MINERAL
L. INST.631, 660-62 (1971).
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section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution provides that the federal
government can exercise exclusive legislative jurisdiction, with
the consent of the states involved, over areas acquired by the
government for various federal purposes.225By this means, some
areas have become federal islands or enclaves. In many respects,
the law governing these areas is foreign to the law of the states in
which they are situated; in general, federal law, rather than state
law, is applicable to an area under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States. Once a state has ceded jurisdiction
to the United States, it is powerless to assert control over the
area.226It should be noted in this context that the term exclusive
legislative jurisdiction is applied to situations where the federal
government has received all authority over the enclave except the
power reserved to the state to serve process in litigation arising
from activities that occur off the enclave.2nThe contrast between
areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction and areas under concurrent federal-state jurisdiction was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook .228
The extent of federal legislative authority over reserved lands
could have a bearing on whether the states can exercise jurisdiction over the water rights reserved for use on those lands or within
Nethat area. In Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States,22B
vada challenged the right of the United States to withdraw water
from wells on the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot without
full compliance with Nevada law, which requires a permit from
the state engineer. Exclusive jurisdiction over the site had been
ceded by the state in 1935. The federal district court denied relief
on the merits, rejecting Nevada's claim of proprietary rights over
the groundwater in question on a theory of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction within the depot .230 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied in part on the fact that the state had ceded
legislative and administrative jurisdiction over the area.231The
court relied more directly, however, on the fact that only Congress
225. The cited clause is not the source of federal authority over Indian reservations;
that authority derives from the commerce clause, U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, c1. 3, and the
property clause, U.S. CONST.art. IV, $ 3, c1. 2.
226. See Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev.
1958), af'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
LAWIN
227. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). See also U.S. DEP'TOF THE INTERIOR,
RELATION
TO NATIONAL
PARKS162 (1933).
228. 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
229. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1960).
230. 165 F. Supp. at 604-09.
231. Id. at 602-03.
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may impose conditions on the use of reserved
The trial
court's dismissal of the state's complaint was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the waiver of
sovereign immunity provided by the McCarran Amendment233
did not apply to the relief sought by Nevada.
Whether the United States has exclusive legislative authority may also affect jurisdiction of the federal courts and the law
to be applied when adjudicating the status of the water rights
appurtenant to private lands .within the exterior boundaries of a
federal enclave. In Macomber v. B o ~ e , ~the
" plaintiffs predecessor owned land within the boundaries of Glacier National Park
in Montana as it was created by an act of Congress in 1910.
Montana ceded jurisdiction in 1914. In 1936, plaintiffs predecessor conveyed to the government a parcel of land containing a
spring. The grantor, however, reserved the water rights to the
spring and an easement to get the water to his other properties
within the boundaries of the park.235The court action was brought
for the purpose of protecting those water rights. The federal district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that state law was applicable to determine and protect the
water rights.'" The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, remanded for trial, and stated:
By this cession [of state legislative authority] and acceptance,
federal authority became the only authority operating within
the ceded area. State law theretofore applicable within the area
was assimilated as federal law, to remain in effect until changed
by Congress. Rights arising under such assimilated law arise
under federal law and are properly the subject of federal juris-

Accordingly, the federal courts have jurisdiction over an action
adjudicating any water rights within a federal enclave, whether
acquired a t the time of or subsequent to the creation of the enclave and cession of state jurisdiction over the area.
232. Id. at 608-09. For a discussion of the Shamberger case see notes 183-86 and
accompanying text supra.
233. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
234. 401 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1968).
235. Some of the facts stated are taken from the district court's decision, 266 F. Supp.
665 (D. Mont. 1967).
236. 266 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mont. 1967).
237. 401 F.2d at 546.
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B. Judicial Authority over Reserved Water Rights
[Tlhe title to a water right is not perfect in any claimant until
there has been an adjudication or legal determination of the
same and the title thereto adjudged to be in the claimant as
against all the world, either by the judgment or decree in a
proper action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction or the
award or determination as the result of a proceeding before some
board or administrative officers under a special statute authorizing such proceeding, and such final decree or determination
designating the owner of the right and defining the nature and
extent of the same and making a permanent record thereof.238

An action to adjudicate water rights is an equitable action
to determine and fix the ownership, nature, and extent of the
rights of all users claiming rights in the same stream or water
supply in relation to each other.239Until an administrative mechanism is developed to define the nature and extent of federal
reserved water rights,240
state and federal courts will remain the
only forums where the scope and measure of such rights may be
established. This subsection discusses the division of jurisdiction
between those judicial forums.
Following a brief discussion of state court jurisdiction over
reserved water rights owned by the United States, this subsection
considers the unresolved issue of whether the states also have
jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights which are held in
trust by the United States. It is possible that Indian water rights
could be subjected to state jurisdiction in the future by legislation
or judicial decree; hence, the right to remove cases involving Indian reserved rights from state to federal courts may become an
issue and is also analyzed. Finally, the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction over interstate stream adjudications is discussed.
1. T h e McCarran A m e n d m e n t and state jurisdiction over nonIndian reserved water rights
All reserved water rights were adjudicated in federal courtsu1
238. 3 C. KINNEY,
A TREATISE
ON THE LAWOF IRRIGATION
AND WATER
RIGHTS
2755 (2d
ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as KINNEY].
239. Id. at 2756-57.
240. The establishment of such a mechanism is proposed and discussed in section 111,
C infra.
241. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U S . 546 (1963); United States v. Powers,
305 U S . 527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U S . 564 (1908); United States v.
Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U S . 988 (1957), reu'd,
330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
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until the 1952 passage of the McCarran Amendment,242which
granted a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity.243The
Amendment permits suit against the United States in stream
adjudications where the United States' water rights are involved.
Early constructions of the McCarran Amendment placed two restrictions on the scope of the statute: (1)before the United States
could be joined, a complete adjudication of the entire stream
system was neces~ary,~'
and (2) the United States could only be
joined in those cases involving federal water rights acquired purIn the 1971 case of United States v. District
suant to state
Court for Eagle County,z46however, the Supreme Court interpreted the Amendment to include the reserved water rights of
federal non-Indian reservations and enclaves.
An analysis of the Eagle County case must begin with an
examination of the states' position.247Prior to Eagle County, the
states, in applying their own laws of appropriation, were unable
to quantify the reserved water rights held in any given stream.
Since the United States could refuse to submit to stream adjudiU.S. 924 (1965); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v.
Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States,
161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
242. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), provides in part:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United
States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any
such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State
laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by
reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgements, orders, and
decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the
United States in any such suit.
243. For an application of the McCarran Amendment in a case involving non-Indian
water rights of the United States in Colorado, see United States v. District Court for Eagle
County, 401 U S . 520 (1971).
244. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1963).
245. This latter restriction was never articulated by a court construing the McCarran
Amendment. Federal authorities, however, generally believed that the Amendment applied only in cases involving federal water rights acquired under state law. See Brief for
the United States a t 8-19, United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971).
246. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). See also United States v. District Court for Water Div. No.
5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
247. Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming filed amici curiae briefs in support of the respondent and in opposition to the position of the United States. 401 U.S. a t 521.
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cations by asserting sovereign immunity, the states found themselves in what they regarded as an intolerable position: they were
unable to effectively quantify and administer water rights among
their citizens.248
The states asserted the need for a forum where
all claimed rights in a given stream, whether private, state, or
federal, could be adjudicated without the need to await a stream
adjudication initiated by the federal government. In addition, the
states desired to have a hand in determining the measure and
scope of the reserved rights. The McCarran Amendment was the
vehicle used to assert state jurisdiction over reserved water rights.
In Eagle County, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the states could subject reserved water rights for non-Indian
reservations249
to judicial determination in state courts whenever
the proceedings will result in a general adjudication of an entire
watershed or a substantial portion thereofFOThe Court interpreted the McCarran Amendment in these terms:
[W]e deal with an all-inclusive statute concerning "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system" which in
5 666(a)(1) [the McCarran Amendment] has no exceptions
and which, as we read it, includes appropriative rights, riparian
rights, and reserved rights.251

In the new era brought about by Eagle County, it is clear that
the United States will be required to submit to the jurisdiction
of state courts for the adjudication of its water rights, whether
reserved or acquired for the benefit of federal enclaves other than
Indian reservations. Neither the Eagle County case nor its companion case, United States v. District Court for Water Division
No. 5,252however, resolved whether the waiver of the McCarran
Amendment applies to Indian reserved water rights; neither Indian lands nor Indian water rights were involved in those c a s e ~ . ~ ~ ~
248. For an example of the states' inability to adjudicate water rights because of the
absence of the United States, an indispensible party, see Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S.
991 (1957).
249. Some may argue that the Eagle County decision permits state courts to adjudicate federal water rights for all federal reserved lands, including Indian reservations. This
article takes the contrary position; see section III, B, 2 infra.
250. 401 U.S. a t 523. The Court held that the Eagle River was a sufficiently large area
for a general adjudication. In the companion case, United States v. District Court for
Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 527,529 (1971), the Court held that regardless of the fact that
the Colorado statutes involved proceedings each month on water rights applications filed
during that month, there was still a general adjudication for purposes of the McCarran
Amendment.
251. 401 U.S. a t 524 (emphasis added).
252. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
253. Brief for Petitioners a t 10 n.3, United States v. District Court for Water Div. No.
5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
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The issue is currently being addressed in the adjudication of the
waters of the San Juan River in Colorado.254

T h e McCarran A m e n d m e n t and state claims of jurisdiction
over Indian reserved water rights

2.

A unique relationship between the federal government and
the Indian people and their property rights originated in article
I, section 8, clause 3 of the C o n ~ t i t u t i o nThat
. ~ ~ ~relationship is
fundamental to the issue of jurisdiction over Indian water rights.
The United States is not the "owner" of rights reserved for
the benefit of Indians in the same way it is the "owner" of water
rights reserved for use on federal parks or forests held for the
benefit of the general public. The Indians' right to the use of
water, though held in trust by the United States, is equitably
owned and exercised by individual Indians and Indian tribes in
connection with their possession of reserved lands.256These water
254. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 946
(1975) (No. 74-949), rev'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973). In this case the
United States won the race to the courthouse. The government brought suit in federal
district court to determine the reserved water rights of the Southern Ute and the Ute
Mountain Ute Indian Reservations, as well as its other reserved rights, in a complete
watershed adjudication of the San Juan River and its tributaries in Colorado. Colorado,
following the precedent set in United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S.
520 (1971), and its companion case, United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5,
401 U.S. 527 (1971),served the United States in its statutory proceedings before the state
water judge pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 8 666 (1970); service occurred after the federal government initiated the watershed adjudication in federal district court.
Colorado's motion to dismiss the federal court suit was granted under the doctrine of
abstention. The district court decided that it was proper to abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction and to permit the state to proceed with its statutory adjudication of the
watershed. In reaching this decision, the federal judge decided that the state court had
jurisdiction of the Indians' water rights as well as other reserved water rights by reason of
43 U.S.C. $ 666 (1970). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
it was not proper to apply the doctrine of abstention in this case since the federal water
rights involved were established by federal law and the United States had the right to
adjudicate its rights in federal court. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the question of the
state court's jurisdiction over Indian water rights.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. In the event the Supreme Court should
reverse the circuit court's order, the parties have briefed the question of the state court's
jurisdiction over Indian water rights. Numerous Indian tribes and the National Tribal
Chairmen's Association have intervened as amici curiae. Brief on the merits for Southern
Ute Indian Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Akin, 421 U.S. 946 (1975) (No.
74-949), granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974). That brief, prepared by Robert S.
Pelcyger of the Native American Rights Fund, is the source of much of the material
presented in section III, B, 2 infra.
255. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913); Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1886);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
256. United States v. Ahtanum I n . Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
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rights are sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which the Indian
reservations were created, regardless of when the water is put to
beneficial use.257
The Indian tribes have always been fearful of losing their
rights through the actions of state courts. The Supreme Court
recognized long ago that the Indians had good cause to be apprehensive of state jurisdiction over their property.258The adjudication of water rights reserved for the use and benefit of Indians and
Indian reservations involves questions of federal law arising under
the Constitution, statutes, and agreements of the United States,
and Congress vested jurisdiction over such questions in the federal district
Thus, issues involved in the determination
of the existence, scope, and measure of Indian water rights have
historically been adjudicated in federal courts. In addition, state
court jurisdiction has been denied where the title, right to use, or
possession of any Indian property which the United States holds
in trust is involved.260
To extend the scope of the McCarran Amendment to include
Indian reserved water rights would dramatically alter this longestablished relationship between federal and state jurisdiction
over Indian property rights. Such an extension of the McCarran
Amendment would be improper in light of the principle of tribal
sovereignty, the relationship of that Amendment to other acts of
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
257. For a discussion of the nature of the Indians' reserved water rights, including
the right to fulfill future needs, and the purposes for which water was reserved see section
11, A supra.
258. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886), the Supreme Court
stated:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feelings, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the
question has arisen.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently repeated concern on this subject. Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. Kings County, No. 74-1565 (9th Cir., Nov. 3, 1975).
259. General federal question jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
260. 18 U.S.C. 4 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970). For a discussion of these
statutes and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970), see note 223 supra and notes 273-78 infra and
accompanying text.
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Congress, the provisions of various state enabling acts and constitutions, and the Amendment's legislative history. Each of these
factors is a bar to subjecting Indian water rights to state court
jurisdiction, as discussed below.

a. The principle of tribal sovereignty. A major purpose for
the creation of reservations was to preserve Indian sovereignty
and provide a place where the tribes, as sovereign entities, could
conduct their affairs and enjoy their property rights without interference. In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has described Indian tribes as distinct, independent political communities261and has shielded their property rights from state jurisdiction since a t least 1832.262For example, in 1973, the Supreme
Court held unanimously in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
C o r n r n i s ~ i o nthat
~ ~ ~ ~ r i i o n ahas no jurisdiction to levy income
taxes on Indians who live and work on the Navajo Reservation.
In its decision, the Court stated that questions involving state
jurisdiction over Indian reservations must always be viewed
against the "backdrop" of Indian tribal sovereignty.264This tradi261. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973), the
Supreme Court said:
The principles governing the resolution of this question are not new. On the
contrary, "[tlhe policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789
(1945). This policy was first articulated by this Court 141 years ago when Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall held that Indian nations were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not
only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832). It followed from this concept of Indian
reservations as separate, although dependent nations, that state law could have
no role to play within the reservation boundaries.
262. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 21-24 (1831). Seegenerally Solicitor's Opinion, 55 Interior Dec.
14 (1934).
263. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
264. The Court explained the principle of tribal sovereignty in these terms:
It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long
predates that of our own Government. Indians today are American citizens.
They have the right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state
services. But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that "[tlhe
relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States . . .
[is] an anomalous one and of a complex character. . . . They were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided." United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
Id. a t 172-73.
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tion of sovereignty and the unique nature of the Indian water
rights are particularly important in determining whether the
McCarran Amendment applies to the adjudication of such rights.
As political sovereigns, Indian tribes are immune from suit
absent express congressional and tribal consent.265To preserve
that immunity, the Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly
held that congressional intent to subject Indians to state jurisdiction will not be lightly implied, that Congress has always been
very careful about subjecting Indians to state jurisdiction, and
that courts should not impute such an intention to Congress in
the absence of a clear, specific, and express conferral of jurisdict i ~ nThus,
. ~ ~when
~ Congress has wished the states to exercise civil
or criminal jurisdiction over Indians, Congress has done so exp r e s ~ l yBoth
. ~ ~ ~tribal sovereignty and the congressional policy of
encouraging, preserving, and protecting that sovereignty, as manifested in such statutes as the Indian Reorganization Act,26sserve
as principal reasons for requiring this kind of congressional exactitude before extending state jurisdiction over Indians.269
265. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal
Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Green v. Wilson, 331
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964); Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d
421 (1968); FEDERAL
INDIAN
LAW,supra note 219, a t 492, 494 (1958). Where federal questions involving the rights of Indian tribes are involved, the Supreme Court in United
States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940), stated as follows:
It has heretofore been shown that the suability of the United States and the
Indian Nations, whether directly or indirectly or by cross action depends upon
affirmative statutory authority. Consent alone gives jurisidiction to adjudge
against a sovereign. Absent that consent the attempted exercise of judicial
power is void.
266. Note, for example, the Supreme Court's reference in Kennerly v. District Court
of Mont., 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971), to "[tlhe comprehensive and detailed congressional
scrutiny manifested in those instances where Congress has undertaken to extend the civil
or criminal jurisdiction of certain States to Indian country." See also McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391
U.S. 404 (1968); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959).
267. E.g., Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. See also Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959); Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d
1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960).
268. 25 U.S.C. 9s 461 et seq. (1970). See also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. $0 450, 450a-n, 455-58, 458a-e (Supp. 1, 1975).
269. As stated in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959):
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. . . . The cases
in this court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Treaty of 1868, and
has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for
Congress to do it.
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The McCarran Amendment speaks of the water rights of the
United States and clearly waives sovereign immunity with respect to those rights owned by the federal government for the
benefit of the public as a whole. However, the Amendment is
silent as to those rights held by the United States as trustee for
the use and benefit of the Indians. Since the Amendment is silent
on that matter and does not expressly grant state court jurisdiction over the party (the individual Indian or the tribe) holding an
Indian water right, it should not, in light of the above-stated
principles, be construed as conferring such jurisdiction. Without
an express statutory grant of personal jurisdiction, state courts
cannot adjudicate Indian reserved water rights. Furthermore,
state courts cannot adjudicate Indian water rights unless they
also have subject-matter jurisdiction over such rights. Thus, unless the McCarran Amendment is interpreted not only as a waiver
of sovereign immunity, but also as a conferral of subject matter
jurisdiction, Indian reserved water rights cannot be adjudicated
in state courts. The Supreme Court has held in a similar context,
however, that s waiver of federal sovereign immunity does not
confer subject-matter jurisdiction on state courts because the
"judicial determination of controversies concerning [Indian
lands] has been commonly committed exclusively to federal
courts. "270

b. The relationship of the McCarran Amendment to other
acts of Congress. Congress has passed a number of statutes which,
unlike the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. $ 666 (section
666),271deal specifically with Indian rights. In ascertaining the
congressional intent behind the waiver of sovereign immunity in
section 666, that section should be considered in relation to these
other acts.27zTwo are of particular importance and, taken together, show that Congress intended that disputes involving Indian property subject to the federal trust relationship, specifically
water rights, are to be adjudicated in a federal forum.
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. $ 1362, which provides:
270. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939).
For an in-depth discussion of this concept and the effect of the cited case on the
applicability of the McCarran Amendment see Brief on the merits for Southern Ute Indian
Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Akin, 421 U.S. 946 (1975) (No. 74-949),
granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
271. Hereafter in the text the McCarran Amendment is sometimes referred to as
section 666. The appellation comes from 43 U.S.C. 9 666 (1970).
272. Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411 (1968).
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The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions, brought by an Indian tribe or band with a governing
body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein
the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States.

According to the House report on section 1362, this statute's purpose is to provide a federal forum for trying issues dealing with
Indian lands held in trust by the United S t a t e P 3 The Senate
report clarifies the House report by noting two reasons for providing a federal forum for such issues: (1) the tribes' fear of the
states, and (2) the federal courts' superior expertise in dealing
with treaties and applying the relevant body of federal law.274
The
important point is not only that Indians fear having their rights
adjudicated in state courts, but also that Congress considers the
Indians' apprehensions justified and has, therefore, enacted a law
vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts to determine federal
questions involving tribal lands and property rights.
In interpreting the applicability of section 1362 in the context
of state fish and game laws, the court in Great Lakes Inter-Tribal
Council, Inc. u. Voigtn5stated:
To require exhaustion of state remedies, or to abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction until the state has undertaken to clarify
the applicability of its fish and game laws to plaintiffs on Indian
lands, would be to dilute the Congressional intention to provide
to the Indians a federal forum for just such questions as those
presented here.

The legal questions concerning reserved water rights are similar
to those concerning reserved fishing rights. Therefore, the reason273. The House report states in part:
In its report to the Senate Committee, the Department of the Interior specifically pointed out that the issues involved in cases involving tribal lands that
either are held in trust or were so held by the tribe subject to restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States are federal issues. The Department
therefore observed that particularly as to this class of cases it is appropriate that
the actions be brought in a U S . District Court.
H.R. REP. NO. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12713-16 (1966).
274. The Senate Report declares;
There is great hesitancy on the part of tribes to use State courts. This reluctance
is founded partially on the traditional fear that tribes have had of the States in
which their reservations are situated. Additionally, the Federal courts have
more expertise in deciding questions involving treaties with the Federal Government, as well as interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed
over the years.
S. REP. NO. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
275. 309 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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ing and approach in Voigt should apply to cases involving Indian
reserved water rights.
The second relevant statute is 28 U.S.C. $ 1360, enacted by
Congress on August 15, 1953, only 13 months after enactment of
the McCarran Amendment. Section 1360 constitutes part of the
statutory provision popularly called Public Law 280, which
granted certain states authority to assume by appropriate legislation limited civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians. Subsection (b) of that section reads:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band,
or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall
confer jurisdiction upon the State to adudicate, i n probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of
such property or any interest therein. 276

This subsection is, therefore, a saving clause which reiterates the
existing law and preserves it against encroachment by the states'
assertion of jurisdiction under subsection (a). Subsection (b) specifically speaks of Indian water rights and denies state jurisdiction to adjudicate such rights.
Section 1360(b) should be read i n pari materia with section
666.277In light of the strong reiteration of federal jurisdiction over
Indian water rights in section 1360(b) in 1953, Congress could not
have intended to subject such rights to state court jurisdiction in
1952 by enacting section 666. The saving language of section
1360(b) would make no sense if Congress had recently subjected
Indian water rights to adjudication in state courts. Section
1360(b) must therefore be read as a clear assertion that state
courts did not have jurisdiction over Indian water rights prior to
its enactment and could not place any encumbrance on nor adjudicate any such rights by assertions of state jurisdiction thereafter.278
The McCarran Amendment, when read (as it should be) in
tandem with both 28 U.S.C. $1360(b) and 28 U.S.C. $ 1362, does
276. 28 U.S.C. $ 1360(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
277. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411-13 (1970).
278. Congress reenacted $ 1360(b) as a part of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, $ 401, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).
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not reveal a congressional intent to extend state jurisdiction to
Indian reserved water rights.

c. State enabling acts and constitutions. The enabling acts
and constitutions of the Western States further demonstrate the
distinction between Indian reserved water rights and other reserved water rights, as they relate to the jurisdiction of state
courts to effect water adjudications. Those acts and constitutions
contain disclaimer clauses applicable to Indian lands and property rights, b u t not to other federal interests. The disclaimer
clauses exist because Congress expressly conditioned the admission of new states with Indian reservations within their boundaries on a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian property rights.
The enabling acts of Arizona, Washington, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and South Dakota conditioned admission to the Union in these, or nearly identical, terms:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and
declare . . . that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes
shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States . . . .279

This language is duplicated in each of the respective state constit u t i o n ~ The
. ~ ~ courts
~
have consistently held that states which
have no disclaimer provision are subject to the same limitations
on state jurisdiction as the states listed above.281
When Congress has acted to extend state jurisdiction over
279. New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, 5 2, cl. 2, 36 Stat. 588 (1910); see Arizona
Enabling Act, ch. 310, 5 20, cl. 2, 36 Stat. 569 (1910); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 5 3, cl.
2, 28 Stat. 108 (1894); Enabling Act of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
Washington, ch. 180, 5 4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677 (1889).
Idaho and Wyoming have similar provisions in the Organic Acts that conditioned
their admittance to the Union. See Organic Act of Wyoming, ch. 235, 5 1, 15 Stat. 178
(1868); Organic Act of Idaho, ch. 17, 5 1, 12 Stat. 809 (1863).
If there is ambiguity present in the statute, it must be construed liberally in favor of
the Indians. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U S . 164, 174 (1973).
280. See ARIZ.CONST.art. 20, $ 4; MONT.CONST.art. 12, 5 2; N.M. CONST.art. 21, 5
2; N.D. CONST.art. 26, 5 203; UTAHCONST.art. 3, 5 2; S.D. CONST.art. 22, 5 2; WASH.
CONST.art. 26.
281. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U S . 243 (1913); United States v. Kagama, 118
U S . 375 (1886); Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d
1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U . S . 829 (1960). In Whyte, the Colorado Supreme Court
acknowledged this principle when it declared that
[Tlhe jurisdiction of the federal government over all Indian affairs is plenary
and subject to no diminution by the states in the absence of specific congressional grant of authority to them to act.
140 Colo. at 337, 346 P.2d a t 1014 (emphasis added).
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Indian reservations, it has specifically waived the disclaimer provision in state enabling acts and authorized states with constitutional or statutory impediments to the assumption of such jurisdiction to remove the impediments and assume jurisdiction. An
example is section 6 of Public Law 280,282which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the
admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby
given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary,
their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be,
to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this
Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become
effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any
such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended
their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.283

Section 666, by contrast, is silent as to the disclaimer provisions
in state enabling acts and constitutions. Congress enacted the
McCarran Amendment knowing that extension of state jurisdiction to Indians or their property requires (1) waiver or repeal of
the disclaimer clauses in the enabling acts, and (2) amendment,
with the consent of the United States, of state constitutions or
statutes. Nothing is more indicative of the congressional intent
to exclude the reserved water rights of Indians from the sweep of
section 666 than the absence in the McCarran Amendment of a
repeal or waiver of the enabling acts and the absence of consent
to the amendment of state constitutions or statutes.
Any argument for extension of state jurisdiction over Indian
water rights under the authority of the McCarran Amendment
would necessarily posit that the Amendment repeals by implication the disclaimer clauses in the enabling acts applying to the
various states. An accepted principle of statutory construction,
however, disfavors repeals by implication. In fact, the courts have
elevated that disfavor to the level of a presumption: prior law is
not repealed by implication.284
d. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment.
The express intent of Congress necessary to grant to the states
jurisdiction over Indian water rights is lacking in section 666.285
282. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590.
283. Id. For an example of the extension of jurisdiction to Indians by the State of
Washington under this Act see Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648 (9th
Cir. 1966).
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
§ 23.10 (4th ed. 1973). See also
284. C. SANDS,
STATUTES
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U S . 535 (1974).
285. See notes 265-269 and accompanying text supra.

6391

THE WINTERS DOCTRINE

707

Where a statute on its face is unambiguous, no resort to its legislative history should be necessary."( Nevertheless, support for
state jurisdiction over Indian water rights cannot be found in the
history of section 666.287
3. Removal of Indian water rights cases to federal court

If it were determined for any reason, either by legislation or
court decree, that the McCarran Amendment does apply to reserved water rights held in trust for Indian reservations and that
state courts do have authority to adjudicate Indian water rights
along with all other claims in a given stream, the question arises
whether the Indians or the United States can remove the adjudication to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the general
federal removal statute.288Section 1441(b) provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.

As discussed earlier, Indian reserved water rights are created
pursuant to the Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United
States.289While there has never been a determination that an
issue involving an Indian water right poses the type of federal
question which will permit removal from state to federal court, a
number of actions involving other types of Indian trust property
rights have been so removed. For example, Indians have removed
contested probate proceedings,2Q0
proceedings concerning allotted
286. United States v. Zion Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 313 ~ 2 331,
d 336 (10th Cir. 1963);
Diamond A Cattle Co. v. C.I.R., 233 F.2d 739, 742 (10th Cir. 1956); Nicholas v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 195 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1952); cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 31 (1933).
287. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 666 see Brief on the merits for
Southern Ute Indian Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae a t 16-19, United States v. Akin, 421
U.S. 946 (1975) (No. 74-949), granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
288. It should be remembered that the federal court's jurisdiction in the event of a
removal is derivative; i.e., on removal a federal court can adjudicate only those issues
which the state court could have adjudicated in the case if no removal had occurred.
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). If the state court had no jurisdiction over
Indian water rights, removal of the action to federal court would apparently not give
jurisdiction to the federal court, and another case would have to be filed in the federal
court.
289. See notes 195-209 and accompanying text supra.
290. E.g., Berry v. Brakeshoulder, 162 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1947).
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Indian lands,2g1and suits to cancel oil and gas leases.292An effort
to remove cases involving Indian water rights may be anticipated
in most cases because the Indians fear that their rights will be
prejudiced by rulings on evidence and procedural questions in
antagonistic state courts.
Both state and federal interests could be protected if cases
involving Indian water rights were initially filed in state courts
and later removed to federal courts. 28 U.S.C. 8 1441(c) grants a
federal court the option in a removed case to determine only those
separate or independent claims which present federal questions,
and in the meantime to remand all other matters to the state
court for d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n Accordingly,
.~~~
a state could initiate a
proceeding in its own court to adjudicate all rights in a given
stream system. The federal questions and issues concerning reserved water rights held for the benefit of Indian reservations
could be removed for determination in federal court with all other
issues being remanded to the state court. Proceedings in state
court could continue on non-federal rights until the point is
reached where the ladder of priorities must be matched against
the available water supply. At that point, the federal court's ruling could be returned and incorporated into the state decree.2g4
By
this means, all the rights in a stream system could be established
and incorporated in one decree and enforced by one court.295
Whether cases affecting reserved water rights can be removed is another unanswered question. The Supreme Court did
not address the question of removal in the Eagle County
291. E.g., House v. United States, 144 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 781 (1944).
292. E.g., Jackson v. Gates Oil Co., 297 F. 549 (8th Cir. 1924).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or in its discretion, may remand
all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
294. The federal court, however, may retain jurisdiction to enforce its decree if the
reserved right is not adequately protected by the state court.
295. There is a risk involved in using this procedure, however. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
provides that if the federal court remands the case back to the state court from which it
was removed, that remanding order is not reviewable. Therefore, under the present state
of the law, there is the risk that the federal court may remand the entire case to the state
court for determination of the measure and extent of both the federal reserved rights and
the Indians' reserved water rights. In such a case there would be no remedy to the remand
order by appeal.
296. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). For a discussion of the removal question see In re Green
River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956).
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Although the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment
reveals that a provision concerning removal of federal questions
by the United States was eliminated from the Amendment,297the
implications of that elimination are unknown.
4. T h e Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over interstate
stream apportionments
The determination and enforcement of reserved water rights,
including Indian water rights, are suits in the nature of quiet title
actions298except to the extent interstate stream apportionments
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court are involved.29gThere the action is to apportion the waters
between the several states involved. Such an apportionment action may include establishing the measure and priority of the
water rights reserved by the federal government in the various
streams and quieting the title thereto against all other users.300In
such proceedings, each state represents the interests of all water
users claiming under its law.301
Interstate apportionment suits may be filed by the states
against each otherso2or initiated by the United States.303An initiating petition is addressed on motion to the discretion of the
Supreme Court. The bases upon which the United States may
urge the Court to exercise its jurisdiction are fivefold:
(1) The United States is a necessary party in an interstate
stream adjudication; therefore, i t should be able to initiate the
action.
297. Hearings on S. 18 Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Adjudication of Water
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951).
298. See 3 KINNEY,
supra note 238, a t 2756-57.
299. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1251(a) (1970).
300. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
supra note 238, $ 1224.
301. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); 3 KINNEY,
302. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517
(1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U S . 660 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 805 (1931), modified, 347 U.S. 995 (1954); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496 (1922),
vacated and new decree entered, 353 U.S. 953 (1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125
(1902); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970).
303. 28 U.S.C. $ 1251(b)(2) (1970) permits the Court in the exercise of its discretion
to accept suits initiated by the United States against a state. United States v. Nevada,
412 U.S. 534 (1973), brought under the above-cited statute, involved federal claims for
the reserved right to the use of water out of the Truckee River, an interstate stream that
runs from California into Nevada. It included the claim of reserved rights for the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe to sufficient water in the Truckee River to maintain Pyramid Lake, a
large desert lake, and its fishery. The lake is within the Indian reservation boundary. The
Supreme Court, however, refused to accept jurisdiction.
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(2) An interstate stream is involved; therefore, the Supreme Court is the only court in which jurisdiction can be obtained over all the parties and all the water in one action. The
multiplicity of suits in separate states that could occur should be
avoided.
(3) Extensive efforts a t compromise by the means of a
federal-interstate compact have been unsuccessful.
(4) Determination of the measure and priority of a federal
right is necessary before a solution dividing the waters of the
stream can be reached.
(5) An apportionment action would be a less expensive and
time-consuming method for determining the reserved right involved.
If the Supreme Court refuses to accept jurisdiction of an
adjudication involving an interstate stream, separate actions
would be required in each state; in the absence of special legislation, the state and federal courts would not have the requisite
jurisdiction to adjudicate all rights in a single action.304In effect,
water rights in an interstate stream would remain uncertain
where there has been no apportionment of the waters of that
stream between the various states. This would be so in spite of
the desire of the states and their water users for a final adjudication.

C. Administrative Authority and a Proposal for Federal
Administrative Action to Determine Reserved Water Rights
Water rights in the Western States are either acquired pursuant to the laws of the states where use occurs or are expressly
or impliedly reserved by the federal government to fulfill the
purposes underlying withdrawal or reservation of land.305Both the
federal and state sovereigns have the authority to administer and
control the waters within the scope of their respective jurisdict i o n ~The
. ~ ~states
~ received their authority over a hundred years
304. E.g., United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Equity No. D-183 (D. Nev.,
filed May 11, 1925) (the court obtained jurisdiction in both California and Nevada pursuant to a special statute). In the absence of such a statute, the jurisdiction of both federal
and state courts stop a t the state boundary.
305. This assumes that the Indians' aboriginal water rights discussed in section II,
A, 2 supra are a portion of the water right impliedly reserved by the federal sovereign for
the Indians when the reservations were created.
306. Dividing water reserved for a federal reservation or enclave, other than Indian
reservations, among various uses to fulfill the purposes of that reservation is strictly a
federal prerogative. See notes 313-318and accompanying text infra. Where Indian reservations are concerned, the amount, period, place, and nature of water use is a matter for
the Secretary of the Interior and the affected Indian tribe, band, or group to decide and
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ago when the federal government authorized them to administer
and control the use of water among their citizens.307During the
past century, Congress, with only a few exceptions,308
has permitted the states to establish, administer, and control water rights
within their borders without interference. Nevertheless, without
the consent of the federal government, the states cannot adjudicate, administer, or control the use of reserved water rights.309
The independent federal and state water systems may at
times overlap and conflict when both allocate waters in the same
stream. The only machinery that has been used to date to resolve
questions of conflicts between water rights protected by state and
federal law is the interminable, expensive, and often inconclusive
stream adjudication proceeding.310The inadequacy of this
method is one reason that the scope and measure of the Indians'
reserved water right has remained undefined for so many years.
Since present adjudicative methods are inadequate or ineffective,
the question arises whether a more effective method can be devised to quantify the water rights reserved for federal enclaves
and Indian reservations and thereby establish the amount of
water remaining in the various watersheds for the states to administer and control among their water users. This question presents the most important unmet challenge in American water law.
At present, there is no federal administrative machinery in
existence that can control and administer the use of reserved
water rights within the various federal enclaves and reservations
or set the measure of the total use for each enclave. Nevertheless,
this author believes that the authority to establish such adminisadminister, subject to court review. See notes 334-343 and accompanying text infra. Use,
control, and administration of water among the citizens of the various states under state
law is a matter for the states to decide and administer. California-Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
307. See notes 6-20 and accompanying text supra.
308. One exception, embodied in § 8 of the Reclamation Act, is set forth in note 111
supra. That section requires that water rights of reclamation projects be established
pursuant to state law, but also provides that such water rights are appurtenant to the land
upon which the water is used regardless of state law.
309. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S.
1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.
1939); Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd
on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
310. For example, United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Equity No. D-183
(D. Nev., filed May 11, 1925) is still pending. Another example is United States v. Orr
Water Ditch Co., Equity No. A-3 (D. Nev., Sept. 8, 1944) which was filed on March 3,
1913; the stipulated decree entered in that case is the subject of a current suit, United
States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed Dec. 21, 1973),
because the court failed to consider a reserved water right in the Truckee River for the
preservation of Pyramid Lake and its fishery.

712

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

trative machinery currently exists. This subsection discusses that
authority and the need to establish the measure of the reserved
right on a use-by-use basis in each vatershed. It proposes that the
various federal administrative agencies, particularly the Department of the Interior, acting jointly with the Indian tribes where
Indian reservations are involved, establish administrative machinery to quantify the reserved water rights of all federal reservations and enclaves. Further, it explains how that machinery could
relatively rapidly identify the various uses of reserved water required to fulfill the purpose of each reservation or enclave. The
amount of water remaining for the use of other water users under
state administration will then be apparent. Because of the important differences between non-Indian and Indian reserved water
rights, federal action with respect to these rights will be treated
separately .
1. Administrative authority for and proposed action to determine non-Indian reserved water rights

An administrative mechanism for determining non-Indian
reserved water rights is clearly needed. Consider, for example, the
reserved water rights of military enclaves. Presently, there are no
Army regulations instructing commanders of posts, camps, and
stations concerning the quantification and protection of water
rights reserved for their installation^.^^^ The cost of water is increasing daily and acquisition of congressional appropriations for
condemnation or inverse condemnation procedures is difficult
and time consuming. Further, if the military fails to act, presently unused reserved waters may be utilized by others pursuant
to state law. The inequity of eventually taking those waters from
users who were without notice of the reserved right could result
in the diminution or loss of the water rights of many military
reservations. Similar problems now exist for other federal reservations and enclaves including national parks, monuments, and
forests, and fish and wildlife areas. It is therefore imperative that
the federal departments involved establish the priority, amount,
and location of each of the uses of reserved water rights
benefitting their reservation^.^'^
311. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,MILITARY
RESERVATIONS,
PAMPHLET
NO. 27-164 (1965) (no
section therein discusses establishing or protecting the military's water rights).
312. It is the author's opinion that the United States Supreme Court may interpret
the McCarran Amendment (see section 111, B supra) to grant authority to the states to
do this task if the federal government does not quickly make a concerted effort to do the
job.
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Allocating the water reserved for a non-Indian federal reservation or enclave among the various uses necessary to fulfill the
purpose of that reservation is strictly a federal prerogative.313The
prerogative may be exercised by each federal department or
agency with respect to reserved lands subject to its control. This
authority is derived from the responsibility of each department
to effectuate the purposes for which the lands under its jurisdiction were reserved. For example, the Department of the Interior
has sufficient authority under the act establishing the National
Park Service314to fulfill the "fundamental purpose" of all national parks and monuments which includes the authority to do
those things necessary ". . . to conserve the scenery . . . and the
wildlife therein . . . by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generation^."^'^ That authority
reinforced the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United
States u. Cappaert316that the federal sovereign intended to reserve water for the Devil's Hole addition to Death Valley National
Monument. Thus, a statute which supports an implied reservation of water to fulfill the purposes stated therein also impliedly
grants the authority to quantify the amount of the reserved water
and to provide for the administration and control of its use.317
Because the various federal departments administer the property
of the United States by congressional directive, the secretaries of
those departments have the authority to accomplish the purposes
of the reservations which they are charged with administering,
313. Cases cited note 309 supra; FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See generally
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
314. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
315. Id.
316. 508 F.2d 313, 318 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 741107, 74-1304). For a discussion of the authority of the Department of the Interior, acting
jointly with the affected tribe, band, or group, to administer and control the use of water
on Indian reservations see section 111, C, 2, b infra.
317. The extent of such administrative power must be determined by the purpose of
the act granting the power and the difficulties that might be encountered in its execution.
United States v. Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654 (1914); Certified Color Indus.
Comm. v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960). An early case stated: "It is a general
principle of law, in the construction of [grants of administrative power], that where the
end is required, the appropriate means are given." United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 238, 253 (1835). It has also been stated that
[When a statute imposes a mandatory duty upon a governmental agency to
carry out the express and specifically defined purposes and objectives stated in
the law, such statute carries with it by necessary implication the authority to
do whatever is reasonably necessary to effectuate the legislative mandate and
purpose. Corzeliu~v. RBilroad Com. (Tex Civ App) 182 SW2d 412.
73 AM. JUR.2d Statutes 9 311 (1974).
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without further delegation from C o n g r e ~ s . Thus,
~ ' ~ the Department of Defense has authority over the reserved water rights of
military reservations and enclaves; the Department of Agriculture, the reserved water rights of national forests; and the Department of the Interior, the reserved water rights of fish and wildlife
areas, national parks, monuments and recreation areas, and the
public domain.
It is proposed that each of these departments immediately
exercise that authority by completing an inventory of the potential land and water uses necessary to accomplish the purposes for
which each reservation and enclave under its jurisdiction was
created. These inventories should determine on a use-by-use
basis the measure and scope of all water rights reserved for nonIndian reservations and federal enclaves. Acting in conformity
with the Administrative Procedure Act,319the Departments of
Interior, Agriculture, and Defense can, within existing authority,
promulgate regulations that establish water use permit systems
on a use-by-use basis with appropriate notice, hearing, and appeal procedures. Pursuant to those regulatory systems, the departments can quantify the amount, and determine the priority
date, of reserved water rights. The states and their water users
can appear, participate in the proceedings, and, if necessary to
protect their rights, appeal to the courts. In this context, the
states can be encouraged to appear as parens patriae on behalf
of all water users claiming water rights under state law.320All
three departments have existing administrative machinery for
holding hearings, reaching decisions, and processing appeals.321
That machinery could be modified to manage the proposed administrative systems. For example, the Department of the Interior, which is responsible for administering most reserved water
rights, could authorize its Office of Hearings and Appeals to con318. In general, the official duties of the head of an executive department of government, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, require the continual exercise
of judgment and discretion. This exercise is especially important in interpreting the laws
and resolutions of Congress under which the department head is required to act. Decatur
v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 518 (1840).
319. 5 U.S.C. § $ 551 et seq. (1970).
320. The states have beenappearing in this manner in stream apportionment suits.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Nothing would prevent the states from rendering the same service to their water users in the
administrative proceedings to be established under this proposal. The state could be
assisted by those water users who feel a need to participate.
321. For example, within the Department of the Interior there are several administrative boards which could be modified, including a Board of Land Appeals and a Board of
Indian Appeals.
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duct hearings and make decisions on water matters. With an
expanded staff and a revised description of its duties in the Code
of Federal Regulations, that office, with its various appeal boards,
could readily handle appeals concerning the measure and scope
of reserved water rights. It is imperative that these departments
take the necessary steps to establish the priority, amount, and
location of each of the uses of the reserved water rights which
they are charged with administering for the benefit of those reservations which are used by the public as a whole.
2. Administrative authority for and proposed action to deter-

mine Indian reserved water rights
Since non-Indians cannot acquire rights in water reserved for
the tribal and allotted lands of Indian reservations, except as
prescribed by Congress,322
efforts to appropriate water under state
law for use on or around Indian reservations cannot interfere with
the Indians' reserved rights.323
How then can an Indian and a nonIndian using water from the same source determine their relative
rights to water other than by initiating a complete stream adjudication?324
Except in those few instances involving lands served by
Indian irrigation projects,325there is no administrative or other
legal machinery in existence that provides an adequate alternative to the stream adjudication proceeding. It is contended herein
that a need exists for such an administrative alternative for determining the measure and scope of the reserved water rights of
Indian reservations. This need, and the reason the water right
must be established on a use-by-use basis, are the first matters
considered in this subsection. The authority of the Secretary of
the Interior, acting jointly with the affected tribe, band, or group,
322. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
323. Id. a t 654. In particular, see the claims of the United States in United States v.
Be1 Bay Community & Water Ass'n, Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23,1971).
The case concerns the rights of non-Indians to use ground waters of the Lummi Indian
Reservation. The water rights of non-Indian transferees of Indian allotments are discussed
in section 11, A, 5 supra.
324. The non-Indian who desires to resolve the problem by initiating a stream adjudication cannot find a state forum with jurisdiction over Indian water rights for the reasons
discussed in section III, B, 2 supra. Even the federal court may lack jurisdiction over the
Indians and their water rights for the reasons discussed in section 111, C, 2, a infra.
325. E.g., Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302, as amended Act of May 29,
1908, ch. 216, 5 15, 35 Stat. 444 (authorizing the Flathead Irrigation Project). The Secretary of the Interior has adopted regulations and administrative procedures for the management of the various irrigation projects operated under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 25 C.F.R. Subchapters R, S, T & W (1975). These regulations cover only a small
portion of the lands of the various reservations.
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to establish such a system for each reservation, is then discussed.
Finally, the operation and benefits of an integrated IndianInterior administrative water permit system are examined in
light of the current lack of a workable system.

a. The need for administrative machinery. The earlier discussion of reserved water rights establishes that such rights exist,
and have certain identifiable characteristics. There are many significant legal questions, however, that remain undecided.326Fur326. A review of the decisions regarding the Winters doctrine reveals that reserved
water rights for use upon lands withdrawn from the public domain have the following
established characteristics:
(1) The federal government holds the reserved right to use a quantity of water
to fulfill the purpose for which a reservation or withdrawal of public lands has
been made. In the case of Indian reservations, the United States holds the legal
title as a fiduciary, and the Indians hold the equitable title to the right to use
water.
(2) The quantity of water reserved may be set a t the amount that is reasonably
necessary for all present and future needs under current standards of economic
feasibility. The same standard applies to Indian reservations except that economic feasibility is determined without requiring repayment of the construction
cost of Indian irrigation projects until the land passes out of Indian ownership.
If for practical reasons this amount cannot or need not be ascertained, and the
amount of reserved water is de minimus with respect to the supply, the reservation will embrace an unquantified amount sufficient for the future requirements
of the reservation.
(3) The reservation of water is inferred from the purposes sought to be
achieved in the treaties, acts of Congress, executive orders, or executive agreements which reserved the land.
(4) The reserved water right appears to have a proprietary-ownership of land
and water-basis under the property clause of the Constitution, although
Arizona v. California provides the basis for a reservation doctrine independent
of ownership of federal lands under the commerce clause powers over navigable
waters and Indian tribes.
(5) The water right is not dependent upon the application of water to beneficial use at any specified point in time.
(6) The water right is not lost by nonuse, laches, or prescription under state
law.
(7) The reserved water right has priority from the date of the creation of the
reservation involved.
(8) The right is subject to private appropriations under state law that vested
prior to the date the reservation was created.
(9) The right is senior to all appropriations or other uses under state law
thereafter made.
A number of questions concerning the measure and scope of the reserved water right
have not been clearly and entirely decided, including:
(1) What showing is required to establish the sovereign's implied intent to
reserve the waters when the reservation was created?
(2) What are the nature and scope of those purposes for which the use of water
will be deemed to be reserved?
(3) May the original purposes for which water will be impliedly reserved be
expanded, and if so, how?
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ther, the factual questions involved in determining the measure
and scope of the reserved rights of specific reservations will remain unanswered until the Winters doctrine is judicially or administratively applied in each situation on a use-by-use basis.
The measure to be established should include the amount, period, place, and nature of each use. Until that occurs, no one can
determine the amount of return flow. Only when the return flow
is known can the amount of water available in a watershed for use
by nonfederal water users pursuant to state law be determined.
The only existing method for quantifying the reserved water
rights of an Indian reservation, a complete stream adjudication
suit, is an inadequate means of quantifying these rights for four
reasons. First, stream adjudication suits are interminable, expensive, and often inconclusive. Second, if the Indian water rights are
in an interstate watershed, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire matter in one proceeding, unless the
stream has been apportioned by a prior adjudication or by an
interstate compact.327If the Supreme Court declines to exercise
its jurisdiction, all of the water rights in the watershed cannot be
adjudicated vis-a-vis other rights-regardless of the desire of all
affected water users to have their rights determined-unless one
(4) May nonstatutory withdrawals by the President without express congressional authorization validly reserve a right to water?
(5) May the quantities of water reserved under the Winters doctrine for a given
use based on current standards of economic feasibility be altered upon changed
future feasibility standards?
(6) Can the holder of a reserved water right change the place or nature of his
use of reserved waters? If so, what rules or limitations will apply?
(7) Does the federal government in its own right or as trustee of Indian reservation lands have the right to unappropriated water, independent of its ownership
of the lands, for domestic and industrial uses?
(8) Will the reserved right be implied to fulfill the needs of both Indian and
non-Indian communities established on Indian reservations?
(9) Does the termination of a withdrawal of land as a reservation also terminate the reserved water rights?
(10) Does the reservation doctrine apply to acquired lands or is it confined to
original public domain lands?
(11) What is the effect of the construction of an authorized reclamation project
conflicting with reserved water rights?
(12) Does the reserved right include aboriginal uses of water by the Indians,
such as the farming of the pueblos on the Rio Grande, and the preservation of
the environment of the various reservations for fish, wildlife, and related uses,
such as the protection of minimum stream flows?
Some of the established characteristics of the reserved water right and the unresolved
questions were paraphrased from the itemization in WHEATLEY,
supra note 29, a t 135-36.
WATERCOMM'N,
Those characteristics and questions were further discussed in NATIONAL
supra note 29, a t 459-83.
327. See section 111, B, 4 supra.
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state agrees to appear in the federal court sitting in the other
state. Third, judicial forums for such suits are limited. As demonstrated by discussion of the McCarran Amendment in section 111,
B, 2 supra, state courts and state administrative bodies have no
jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights. Therefore, if the
Indians have rights in a particular stream, only a federal court
may entertain an action to adjudicate those rights. Fourth, the
sovereignty of Indian tribes, discussed in section 111, B, 2, a supra,
may bar suit against a nonconsenting Indian tribe, band, or
group. This could prevent any judicial forum from adjudicating
Indian water rights without the tribe's consent. Rights in the
watershed would remain uncertain because any suit to establish
them would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party-the affected Indian tribe. The problem cannot be
avoided even if the federal government is deemed, as a matter of
law, to have authority to consent on behalf of the Indians. As a
matter of policy, the government will not give that consent if the
affected tribe objects. While Indian tribes may not be able to
successfully argue in court that the United States cannot submit
their water rights to adjudication without the approval of the
affected tribe, it has been the policy of the Department of the
Interior to obtain the agreement of the tribes prior to requesting
the Department of Justice to adjudicate Indian property or water
rights. This policy is based on the Department's interpretation of
the Indian Reorganizations
and the new Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance
It should be noted here that the first two reasons obtain in
the adjudication of all reserved rights, whether Indian or nonIndian. The third and fourth reasons, on the other hand, are
unique problems concerning the use of stream adjudication suits
to quantify Indian reserved water rights, and demonstrate the
unique difficulty of using such existing procedures to establish
the measure and scope of Indian reserved water rights. This discussion of the difficulty of using the present judicial system in
Indian water rights cases is not intended as an argument for
extension of the McCarran Amendment to Indian water rights.
Rather, it is intended to highlight the crucial need for the integrated administrative system proposed below.
The four reasons presented above demonstrate that in many
instances it may be impossible to quantify the rights in a stream
328. 43 U.S.C. $8 315 et seq. (1970).
329. 25 U.S.C.A.$0 450,450a-n,455-58,458a-e(Supp.1, 1975).
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system until the Department of the Interior and the Indian tribes
establish a mechanism to identify the amount, place, and nature
of each use in order that the amount of water remaining for use
by non-federal, private users can be determined. The Secretary
and the Indian tribes, however, have never promulgated water
regulations or instituted procedures that would determine the
amount of water reserved, except for those regulations dealing
with constructed irrigation
The void left by this inaction has provoked varying responses. Some states have made an
administrative determination that waters appropriated by nonIndians under state law are surplus to the needs of the Indians.331
Also, the federal courts have held on occasion that they have a
duty to fill the void.332Judicial action in the face of administrative inaction, however, is not the rule. In one case, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held, on the facts presented to it, that
it was not justified in interfering with the Secretary's duty to
administer reserved watersF3There is, therefore, a clear need for
the Department of the Interior and the affected Indian tribes to
create, under existing authority, administrative machinery that
will establish the measure and scope of Indian reserved water
rights.

b. The authority to establish administrative machinery.
The Secretary of the Interior is charged with administering the
trust responsibilities of the United States with regard to India n ~ . Congress,
~~*
however, holds plenary power over Indians and
their property,335and may withdraw the duties of guardianship
and entrust them to any agency it chooses.336By the adoption of
the General Allotment Act i n 1887,337
Congress gave the Secretary
of the Interior specific responsibilities in the administration of
330. 25 C.F.R. Subchapters R, S, T & W (1975).
331. See Tulalip Tribes v. Walker, No. 71421 (Super. Ct. for Snohomish County,
Wash., Feb. 7, 1963). Until the Indians' water needs are determined, the amount of water
surplus to their needs cannot be known. This requires a determination of the purposes for
which each reservation was created, and a determination of the measure of the water right
which will be implied to fulfill those purposes. See section 11, A, I, a supra.
332. E-g., Segundo v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 554, 558 (S.D. Cal. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 221 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1955).
333. United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1956).
LAW, supra note 219, at 220.
334. 25 U.S.C. 4 2 (1970); FEDERALINDIAN
335. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
294 (1902). See notes 217-23 and accompanying text supra.
336. United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363,367 (1944). Note the transfer of responsibility for Indian affairs from the War Department to the Department of the Interior. Act
of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, 4 5, 9 Stat. 395.
337. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
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water rights for on-reservation uses.33R
The Act gave the Secretary
authority to prescribe rules and regulations to secure just and
equal distribution of the water supply among the Indians.33sThus,
the Secretary may promulgate rules and regulations to provide for
the just and equal distribution of reserved waters. The place,
nature, and amount of each use could be determined by the system so established, and the amount of water remaining for use
by non-Indians will become apparent as the system is implemented.
Since the General Allotment Act must be interpreted and
implemented with due consideration for the sovereign power and
authority of the Indian tribes,340the authority of the Secretary
under that statute is not absolute. Although the Act has been
interpreted by the courts and the Department of the Interior to
provide that the United States has retained jurisdiction and control over waters on Indian reservations,341current administrative
policy and recent legislation3" have established the principle that
the right of self-determination of organized Indian tribes, bands,
and groups will not be interdicted by government officials.
Hence, exercise of the Department's jurisdiction over reserved
water rights must occur jointly with the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Indian tribes, bands, and groups that reside on the various
reservations.343
c.

Proposed administrative action. The first requirement

338. Id. !j 7 (codified at 25 U.S.C. !j 381 (1970)).
339. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939); United States v. Alexander,
131 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir.
1939). The courts have construed the statute to indicate "Congressional recognition of
equal rights among resident Indians," and to require the just and equal distribution of
water when water is in short supply. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939).
This equal right apparently extends to surface waters, United States v. Alexander, 131
F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942) (dictum), and ground waters, Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp.
383 (D. Mont. 1968) (by implication).
340. The sovereignty of the Indian tribes is discussed in section 111, B, 2, a supra.
341. See note 339 supra.
342. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. $ 0 450,
450a-n, 455-58, 458a-e (Supp. 1, 1975).
343. Congress has never acted to restrict the authority of Indian tribes in the administration of water except by 25 U.S.C. !j 381 (1970). Hence, full power and authority would
reside in the joint action of the tribes and the Secretary of the Interior. This authority of
the Indian tribes has only recently received attention. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.
1975). For another example, see the claims of the United States in United States v. Be1
Bay Community & Water Ass'n, Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23, 1971).
For an early expression of this concept see Solicitor's Memorandum to the Department of
Justice, May 5, 1938 (concerning petition for certiorari in United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d
783 (1938)).
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for action is a complete inventory of the existing and potential
land and water uses on each reservation. Such inventories are
already being conducted on many reser~ations.~~VI'hese,
when
completed, will provide the detailed data from which the amount,
period, place, and nature of each use, as well as the return flow,
can be established.
The administrative machinery necessary to quantify Indian
reserved water rights could be created by federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
2 and 25 U.S.C. 8 381. Those regulations should establish standards for departmental approval of tribal water codes, including:
(1) guidelines for using the information contained in the inventory of existing and potential land and water uses to establish the
amount, period, place, and nature of each use through a permit
system on a use-by-use basis; (2) due process requirements for
notice and hearings before tribal water boards; and (3) procedures
for appeal to the Department of the Interior's Board of Indian
Appeals.
Once the Department's regulations are promulgated, the
Indian tribes, bands, and groups should take the lead. In accordance with the regulations, a tribal water board on each reservation, created by and acting under a tribal ordinance, could establish a tribal water code that would provide for the issuance of a
permit for each existing and potential use. Under this permit
system, the various uses of the reserved waters could be established in detail and administered by each tribe, band, or group
on its own reservation by its own tribal water board pursuant to
its own water code.
Once established and implemented with appropriate administrative procedures, these water codes would solve many important unresolved questions concerning the Indians' claims under
the Winters doctrine. Each tribe could take the lead and establish
the position which the tribe or the individual Indian believed to
be correct. Other water users could object to any particular use,
or the measure thereof, by appearing before the tribal water
board. In each case, the action of the tribal water board would
be subject to administrative review in the Office of Hearings and
Appeals of the Department of the Interior. Eventually, the deci344. The Office of Trust Responsibilities in the Bureau of Indian Affairs is responsible
for this program. The Director of that Office stated that as of December 1, 1975, there
were land and water resource studies in various stages of completion in a three phase
program on 96 Indian reservations. These studies will provide much of the information
needed to quantify the Indians' reserved water rights.
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sion in contested cases would be subject to court review.345
If the authority of the tribe over the non-Indian transferee of
an allotment is questioned, or if the water rights exercised by
entrymen owning private lands within reservation boundaries are
in conflict with the Indians' reserved right, the Secretary of the
Interior can delegate his authority over these issues and the nonIndian parties to the Indian tribe for an initial determination
which would be subject to administrative review. In this manner,
the problem that arises when the non-Indian transferee of former
allotted Indian land desires to establish the amount of his water
right is solved by providing him with a forum in which to bring
his case. Similarly, when a non-Indian entryman or non-Indian
neighbor to an Indian reservation wishes to establish his right in
relation to the Indians' right in a particular stream or groundwater basin, he can request a determination by the tribal water
board and then appeal if dissatisfied.
It is contemplated by the author that each of the uses of
water established as feasible in the land and water inventory of
a reservation, and each of the existing uses of water, would be
subject to a permit issued upon completion of the inventory.
When that is done on each reservation, the scope and measure of
the Indians' water right will be established on a use-by-use basis
in each watershed.
Assuming the proposed water codes, regulations, and administrative machinery are provided, a problem arises in integrating
345. 5 U.S.C. 8 702 (1970). Some may claim that it is unjust to make non-Indians
appear before Indian water boards. However, this will be no more of an injustice than to
make the Indians appear in state proceedings.
Arguably, a conflict of interest problem could arise in this context. The reserved water
rights of the various Indian reservations are protected by the Department of the Interior.
The Secretary is the trustee who has the duty to assert and protect the Indians' water
rights. 25 U.S.C. 4 2 (1970); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The performance of that duty will be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards. Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians
v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252,256 (D.D.C. 1972);Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States,
364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. C1. 1966). It could be claimed, therefore, that it is inconsistent for
officers of the Department of the Interior to sit as administrative judges in hearings to
decide conflicting Indian and non-Indian claims to water. The states' administrative
proceedings, however, cannot be used unless Congress so provides. If Congress provided
such jurisdiction, the claimants' appeal from state administrative proceedings would be
to state courts. The author believes that state court jurisdiction to adjudicate the Indian
rights should be denied. See section III, B, 2 supra. Conducting the Department of the
Interior's proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 9 9 551 et seq. (WO), and participation by the state should be adequate protection
for the interests of the non-Indian. If not, another possible solution to the conflict is to
create an independent review board within the federal government, but outside the Department of the Interior.
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this federal system with the states' administrative sy~tems.~"
The
problem could be resolved by the adoption of two proposals. First,
the state should appear in hearings before a tribal water board
as parens patriae for all persons who claim water rights under
state law. Second, copies of all permits issued on a use-by-use
basis by a tribe to itself, its members, or to any other holder of a
reserved right, should, after approval by the Secretary, or resolution on appeal, be filed with the state.
3. Summary: proposed administrative action

If the administrative approach proposed herein is adopted for
Indian and non-Indian reservations, administrative law judges
could immediately begin establishing precedents on the unresolved legal questions of the Winters doctrine. Although the determination of certain issues would require judicial review, many
other questions involved in establishing reserved water rights are
not subject to controversy. Having these matters disposed of by
administrative action would result in a needed economy of judicial effort. Failure to resolve these controversies administratively
may create a substantial workload which would overtax the currently overcrowded federal courts and might necessitate the establishment of a special federal water court.
Although non-Indian reserved rights are important, the Indians' reserved right is by far the largest and most controversial of
the reserved water rights. The administrative machinery proposed herein would bring an early end to much of the controversy
by establishing not only the amount of water available to each
reservation and each Indian user a t the place of each use, but also
the amount remaining to non-Indian users from the same water
source. The administrative system would accomplish this result
by bringing the United States, the Indian water user, and the
non-Indian water user (or the state) into one forum having jurisdiction over the water and all the parties. The system would
permit the United States and the Indian tribes, bands, and
groups to have the maximum input concerning their claims to
water while a t the same time permitting judicial review for those
who seriously disagree. This mechanism is a feasible method for
quantifying reserved water rights in the immediate future. The
346. A single integrated record system of water uses is urgently needed so that the
public can look to one source to determine the extent of water available for their use at
any given water site. See I1 WHEATLEY,
supra note 29, at 570-71.
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necessity of determining relative rights to the nation's water supply mandates adoption of this or a similar administrative approach.

